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Abstract 
Charles Dahan 
Second Great Awakening and Second Party System, A Singular Response to 
Technological Advances: Responses of antidisestablishmentarian ministers to secular 
threats and the use of technology for communication by American sociopolitical 
institutions, 1800-1850. 
(Under the direction of Terry Sullivan, Kevin McGuire, and John Aldrich) 
 
 This paper argues the Congregational Church’s diminished market share in after 
disestablishment in the northeastern United States was not a failure to adapt, but a 
rational decision to preserve an elite, and heavily invested base of parishioners.  I argue 
the unique advantage of the Congregational Church was not state sponsorship, but instead 
its monopoly over the dissemination of news due to its unique regional social network of 
ministers.  
I demonstrate through archival research that the Congregational Church did not 
expend significant resources on recruitment in the face of competing religious 
denominations that characterize the “Second Great Awakening.” By framing the local 
Congregational Sunday service as a forum for gaining information necessary for 
conversation with fellow citizens, parties were a far greater threat to the unique power 
Congregational ministers leveraged for social control, than the ministers and churches 
emblematic of the ‘Second Great Awakening.’ 
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Preface 
 
Three scholars summarize the process by which this piece was produced. 
 
“First thing I remember was asking papa, ‘Why,” for there were many things I did not 
know. And Daddy always smiled, and he took my be the hand, saying, “Someday you’ll 
understand.’ Well I’m here to tell you now each and every mother’s son, someday never 
comes.” 
-John Fogerty 
 
“The production of righteous indignation is allowed to substitute for critical rigor.” 
-Skip Gates 
 
“I have never made but one prayer to God, a very short one: ‘O Lord, make my enemies 
ridiculous.’ And God granted it.”   
-Voltaire 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1 
 
Chapter 1: Political Science Literature .......................................................................... 7 
Chapter 1.1: Archival Case Study: The Congregational Church................................... 10 
Chapter 1.2: Historical Literature .................................................................................. 12 
Chapter 1.3: Institutional Literature............................................................................... 13 
Chapter 1.4: Political and Religious Institutions ........................................................... 15 
Chapter 1.5: Monopolistic Firms ................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 1.6: Disestablishment and Congregational market share ................................. 22 
 
Chapter 2: Communication infrastructure as a source of early American social and 
political institutional development................................................................................. 27 
Chapter 2.1: Mass communication theory ..................................................................... 28 
Chapter 2.2: Communication in rural New England ..................................................... 30 
Chapter 2.3: Liberalization of mass communication ..................................................... 33 
 
Chapter 3: The goals and strategies of Congregational Church in New England communal 
life .................................................................................................................................. 40 
Chapter 3.1: Congregational maintenance of sociopolitical control.............................. 42 
Chapter 3.2: Defining competition ................................................................................ 44 
Chapter 3.3: Unitarian and Congregational split at Harvard and Yale .......................... 46 
Chapter 3.4: Church strictness as determinant of institutional strength ........................ 50 
Chapter 3.5: Training methodology of non-established church leaders ........................ 54 
Chapter 3.6: Evidence addressing the lack of Congregational recruitment................... 55 
 
Chapter 4: Transportation revolution as disruptive sociopolitical force........................ 62 
Chapter 4.1: Transportation’s role in creating a national narrative ............................... 63 
Chapter 4.2: Employment specialization ....................................................................... 68 
Chapter 4.3: Religious revivals and secular competition............................................... 69 
 
Chapter 5: The development of political parties as alternative organizers of social action  
........................................................................................................................................ 74 
Chapter 5.1: Political parties leverage culture ............................................................... 76 
Chapter 5.2: Technology as centralizing force .............................................................. 80 
Chapter 5.3: Political party organization ....................................................................... 84 
Chapter 5.4: Clergy response to political parties ........................................................... 89 
Chapter 5.5: Van Buren’s historical narrative ............................................................... 90 
 
 vii 
Chapter 6: Sabbatarianism as Congregational response to institutional threats ............ 94 
Chapter 6.1: Petitioning efforts as religious response ................................................... 97 
Chapter 6.2: Congregational support of information distribution ................................. 98 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions regarding the role of transportation and communication 
infrastructure in the development of early American social and political institutions .. 101 
Chapter 7.1: Future research .......................................................................................... 102 
 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 Yale Divinity School Enrollment .................................................................... 55 
 
Figure 2: Connecticut Presidential Vote Share, 1824-1840........................................... 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Introduction 
 Scholars of American political and social history often attempt to 
organize histories of particular professions and philosophical disciplines by 
the stated missions of actors, thus creating distinct sectors or organizations--
such as religious denominations, political parties, professional guilds, and 
labor unions— and classifying their actions into independent and separate 
histories.  Such categorizations not only view American political development 
as a directional progression, but also as the development of numerous and 
largely disconnected fields.  In doing so, scholars segregate different types of 
behavior—religious, professional, political—as largely unrelated.  Any 
relationship between, for example, political and religious institutions, 
involves one acting upon the other, rather than each acting in competition 
with the other.  
To further specialize and define these groups, Samuel Huntington, 
Charles Lindblom, and others treat organizations that attempt to overcome 
collective action problems—including religious, labor, and political 
movements—as having a philosophical agenda independent from controlling 
social or political power, and therefore define those organizations as firms or 
interest groups.  Scholars link these interest groups to each other within 
 2 
categories as in competition for the same resources, creating isolated markets 
of goods categorized by type.  For example, politics may be a realm dominated 
by overtly political firms competing for state power, and agents may attempt 
to interact with or influence these political firms only insofar as it furthers 
those external firms’ internal goals or functions.  In this view, a religious 
organization will lobby a political party only on political issues with 
theological overtones.   
This treatment creates and amplifies the importance of the ethical or 
philosophical narratives of these groups by which they bond themselves to 
their members, while at the same time entrenching an artificial distinction 
between interest groups that appeal to particular narratives and the 
functioning of social and political life at large.  Each organization’s nominal 
mission, identified and reinforced through the narrative it creates to define 
its function and legitimize its continued existence—religion, politics, a 
particular profession, etc.—is viewed as a vertical industry and efforts by 
that industry group to cross into alternative types of industries are treated as 
actions intended to further the particular mission of the organization.  
I argue this distinction is both artificial and inaccurate, specifically 
when addressing the American social and political upheaval of 1800-1850.  
Historians and political scientists have so cemented the perception of distinct 
vertical industries as to create two historical events that occurred 
simultaneously yet are treated as completely independent: the second great 
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awakening and the second party system.  As a consequence of the approach of 
historians, the importance of explanations for social upheaval and 
competition between groups across the entire strata of American society is 
understated, while competition by actors within particular fields is amplified.  
I argue, by contrast, the second great awakening and second party system 
neither coincidentally occurred simultaneously, nor that each event is even 
primarily defined by competition amongst groups of a similar mission or type.  
Instead, the development of political parties and the developments of 
religious institutions and participation in New England during the time 
period—notably the undermining of traditional monopolies over 
communication, and therefore social and political control, held by ministers of 
the established churches of particular states—were aided by technological 
and communication advances that allowed secular institutions to develop and 
replace the traditional sociopolitical functions of the established church.   
Understanding this unified history therefore suggests 1) the primary 
form of social and political power for the Congregational Church in New 
England was not state establishment and the coercive penalties to defectors 
but instead the development of social and communication networks, 2) the 
primary to the social and political structure of New England after the 
revolution was not the disestablishment of religion but technological and 
communication advances that undermined the monopoly over the 
distribution of information afforded to established religious leaders with 
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expansive social networks, and 3) the established church of New England—
the Congregational Church—recognized rise of secular organizations—
particularly political parties—as the primary threat to their authority, 
rather, than as contemporary analysts of American political development in 
the field of economics and history argue, competing evangelical groups.  
I treat the second great awakening and the second party system as a 
singular event in the history of American political development, viewing the 
upheaval of social, political, and economic development from the post-
revolutionary to pre-civil war period as driven primarily by a single factor—
technology—that allowed any institution to vie for the time and resources of 
citizens through leveraging a newly available communications 
infrastructure.  I specifically look at the Congregational Church—the most 
dramatically altered institution, as it was disestablished in New England—
and its responses to competitors not only nominally associated with 
theological issues but secular institutions who attempted to fill the social, 
political, and economic roles previously monopolized by the 
Congregationalists through their exploitation of their monopoly over the 
distribution of information.  
As specialized industries catering to social and economic goods 
formed—and institutions were created to overcome resource inefficiencies 
and coordinate social action—more sophisticated methods of competition also 
developed as these institutions identified acquirable goods.  Whereas others, 
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including Charles Sellers, begin by defining the market system that 
developed in early America as a system of trade and specialization, I identify 
the primary market that evolved as for information—therefore increasing 
cross-industry competition rather than isolated markets.  The specific cases 
of the second great awakening and the second party system—regularly 
examined as two separate phenomenon and, resulting with religious groups 
acting upon political parties—instead are a single case resulting from the 
shock of a democratized communication infrastructure.  Rather than viewing 
disestablishment as the catalyst for change in the religious landscape, the 
primary competition to the Congregationalists was from emerging religious 
and secular institutions, caused by those institutions having access to 
technology. 
The Congregational Church leveraged its monopoly over the flow of 
information to control the social, economic, and political functions of a 
community.  This behavior—a classic case of Lindblom’s theory of institutions 
leveraging a monopolized resource to gain power unrelated to their initial 
function or mission--demonstrates the power of information as not only direct 
knowledge but the ability to control discourse within a community, as 
individuals will primarily discuss topics they know others are comfortable 
and familiar with.  Applying this to the case of the Congregational Church, I 
argue the metrics for success traditionally used reaffirm the preexisting 
notion the Church’s primary competition was from alternative religious 
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actors; on the contrary, by demonstrating the goal of the Congregationalists 
was not primarily religious market share, I redefine their competitors as both 
religious and secular actors—any entity that leveraged emerging 
communications technology to undermine the monopoly the 
Congregationalists held over the distribution of information.  Specifically, I 
define the primary competitor to the Congregationalists as the political 
party.  Despite the lack of success initially by Martin Van Buren and his 
Democratic Party in New England, the institutions he built—and which were 
later copied by the successors to the unsuccessful Whigs—directly competed 
with established the Congregational Church over control of the secular social 
and political apparatuses in New England.  
Therefore, I examine the Sabbatarian movement as a response by 
established religious denominations to secular encroachment upon the 
control over the flow of information during the leisure time of New England 
citizens.  Whereas previously Congregational ministers not only controlled 
the distribution of information but also social congregation (by monopolizing 
a town’s physical meeting space) the post office posed a challenge as a 
physical house for discussion as well as a place to receive information from 
abroad.  This dramatically increases the threat of the news, particularly news 
that was created and distributed by partisan and secular interests.  
 
  
 
Chapter 1: Political Science Literature 
 
Samuel Huntington argues American political development is charted 
by the social structure of American society at any point in time, and the 
development of parties and the rise of evangelical congregations from 1800-
1850 furthers his argument that particular narratives are common to the 
vast majority of Americans, as each competing organization—from political 
parties and the Unitarian denomination that largely appealed to secular 
interest, to conservative evangelical ministers and traditional denominations 
that controlled political and social affairs in the 17th and 18th centuries—
appealed to the same anti-egalitarian narratives to recruit and maintain 
members.   
Yet most historians treat upheavals in each vertical field or industry  
independently, defining political transformations as the ‘second party system’  
and the evolution of religious institutions from 1800-1850 the ‘second great 
awakening.’  During this period both secular and sacred institutions 
developed from a radical shock to the traditional power structure of 
America—the undermining of the nodes of communication by the 
democratizing influence of technology and communication advances—and the 
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responses to this shock by all social and political institutions placed all in 
competition.  Rather than exclusively examining religious denominations, 
political parties, social groups, or any particular kind of organization, as 
identified by ideology or policy objectives, the landscape of the social 
structure of America—and the players who defined bounds of the social and 
political discourse—falls into a single framework of how these institutions 
reacted to the liberalization of communication resources during early 
American history.  Those groups who responded successfully still exist; those 
who either failed to fully grasp the magnitude of the shift in communication 
technology, or failed to adequately adapt and utilize the new tools for 
communication, were either dramatically weakened or simply went extinct.   
This communication revolution caused actors with a stake in gaining 
social or political power to seek influence through undermining the 
traditional monopolistic control by established ministers--who, although 
garnering power from state sponsorship, in fact leveraged their entrenched 
social network to maintain their social and political standing.  Beginning 
with Adam Smith, whose brilliant insight into the behavior of religious actors 
as in fact identical to the competitive behavior of economic interests created 
the field of the economics of religion three hundred years prior to its 
contemporary study by Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, authors segregated 
religion and secular institutions as only in competition with others of the 
same kind, rather than a horizontal view of society in which the kind of 
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institution mattered far less than the desired membership level and member 
contribution by any institution.   
Contemporarily, I identify the most egregious culprit for such 
segregation and marginalization of the secular actions of religious actors as 
popular historians of American political development, in particular Arthur 
Schlesinger, who marginalizes political and social action by religious actors 
as either insignificant or attempts to increase membership rather than efforts 
to compete with the social and political powers they are lobbying.  By writing 
history as the development of separate vertical industries—politics, religion, 
social groups, voluntary societies, etc.—Schlesinger fails to understand social 
and political control as a singular aim by all institutions, regardless of the 
profession of their practitioners.  Thus, this essay approaches American 
political development as the struggle by social institutions to control and 
influence the lives of citizens, and to compete for citizens to participate 
within the framework of their particular organization.   
These organizations must overcome collective action problems, and 
create incentives for long-term participation, discourage shirking 
responsibilities and abandonment, and ward off attempts by alternative 
institutions—whether they operate in a similar industry or not—to attract 
participation by members while maximizing membership.  ‘Success’ cannot be 
viewed by a single metric—religious organizations are not successful merely 
by maximizing membership and political institutions are not successful only 
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by winning a particular election or garnering the most contributions.  When 
examining the particular case of this thesis—that of the Congregational 
Church after disestablishment in Connecticut and their adaptation to a 
changing communication landscape with the introduction of competition from 
secular institutions and the undermining of their ministers’ traditional 
monopoly over the flow of information in New England—the motivations of 
elites and citizens, as well as competing sociopolitical institutions—must be 
examined and defined within the framework of the organization addressing 
such collective action and institutional problems while warding off 
competitors. 
 
Chapter 1.1 Archival case study: The Congregational Church 
Using the specific case of the rise of political parties in New England 
after the advent of mass communication technologies and the 
disestablishment of the Congregational Church, I argue the second great 
awakening and second party system are not two separate events—in fact, the 
social, political, and economic upheaval of the nineteenth century’s first four 
decades does not consist of numerous institutional revolutions, but a reaction 
to the technological shock of the transportation and communication 
revolution.  This shock dramatically increased the distribution area of news 
and decreased the cost of publication, thereby undermining the traditional 
flow of information, controlled by local elites--in most cases the local minister 
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whose access to a national social network was unparalleled and therefore 
who served as a monopolistic node over information that was transferred and 
distributed in a locality.  The focus on each field as a separate vertical, 
instead of a view of the transportation revolution horizontally affecting all 
aspects of colonial and antebellum life in New England—fosters a 
misunderstanding by modern theorists and religious economists of the goals 
of the traditional New England power brokers—Congregational ministers, 
and their secular competitors (focusing instead on alternative religious 
denominations and evangelical ministers, rather than their competitors in 
the field of communication and information, political parties.)  I offer an 
alternative claim that technological advances in the distribution of 
information facilitated a national dialogue and a misunderstanding of the 
goals of the Congregational Church explain its drop in market share, 
beginning with an examination of mass communication theory and argue the 
advantage of state sponsorship for the Congregational Church was support 
for institutions that maintained a monopoly over the flow of information 
throughout New England 
In his Pulitzer Prize winning work, What God Hath Wrought, Daniel 
Walker Howe acknowledges the disestablishment of religion, and places it in 
the context of making New England, “more like the rest of the country and 
helped set the stage for the ‘era of good feelings.” (Howe 2009 p.165) 
Voluntary religious institutions, Howe argues, were a democratic training 
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ground for future political leaders, particularly marginalized groups without 
access to the levers of political power.  “Women, African Americans, and 
newly arrived poor immigrants were all participating in religion, often in 
leadership roles, before they participated in politics.  The churches and other 
voluntary associations nurtured American democracy.” (Howe 2009, p. 166)  
While Howe acknowledges the connection between overcoming the ‘tyranny of 
distance’—the tyranny of a lack of information—the true barriers controlling 
the flow of information were, in the case of New England, the ministers of the 
established churches who not only used coercive power to punish congregants 
of alternative faiths but also monopolized the spigot of information which 
flowed to local citizens.   
 
Chapter 1.2: Historical literature 
The focus of historians—including Howe—upon the development of a 
market economy in New England through the development of transportation 
systems ignores the correlated development of the information transported by 
the same systems both by traveling merchants and literature.  In the case of 
the development of canals, “Where earlier settlers had been to some extent 
‘self sufficient’—eking out a subsistence and making do with products they 
made themselves or acquired locally—people could now produce for a market, 
specialize in their occupations, and enjoy the occasional luxury brought in 
from outside.” The nature of information separates it from other goods 
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transported via the nation’s new transportation infrastructure, in that 
information allowed individuals to communicate on diverse topics, as they 
now were informed—and knew their neighbors were informed—about issues 
other than those heard at the town minister’s weekly sermon.  Whereas the 
byproduct of a market was an increase in the flow of information, specialized 
occupations produced guilds and professional organizations that served as 
competition for established religious groups.  Instead of socializing occurring 
on Sundays and self-sufficient professional (largely agricultural) work 
occurring during the week, secular organizations competed directly with 
ministers for the flow of information and social networking activity that 
produced the added benefit of increasing economic competitiveness for 
merchants and professionals.  “Most postmasters were also storekeepers 
selling liquor by the drink on the premises. The federal government 
mandated that post offices open every day, and this overrode whatever state 
and local laws might require Sunday closings.  The post offices thus became a 
conspicuous exception to general Sabbath observance in small town America.  
On Sundays many men would flock to the local post office after church to pick 
up their mail and have a drink.” (Howe 2009, p. 229)   
 
Chapter 1.3: Institutional literature 
Secular organizations created rules and institutions similar to 
established churches to serve the needs of their members, including 
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insurance, education--at least regarding their specific institution-- 
socialization, and rules by which members were forced to abide in order to 
access and maintain the social capital that resulted from their investment in 
the group.  (Olson 1982; Ostrom 1994; Putnam 1993) The cost of distributing 
information and reinforcing social networks dropped as dramatically as the 
price of tangible goods.  Whereas the colonists owned a single set of clothes 
and few items of convenience let alone luxury, by 1825 the cost of a mattress 
fell from fifty to five dollars and a wall clock from sixty to three dollars. 
(Sheriff 1996, from Howe 2009) “Although some of the savings was due to 
mass production, much of it was due to lower transportation costs.” (Howe 
2009)  Without developments to the nation’s transportation infrastructure 
markets beyond immediate geographic areas were impossible, and while 
markets for tangible goods are most obvious and regularly addressed by 
social scientists, the lack of transportation of information (and the networks 
created by religious leaders to facilitate and maintain communication) 
demonstrate the value of news.  “In traditional society, the only items worth 
transporting long distances had been luxury goods, and information about 
the outside world had been one of the most precious luxuries of all.  The 
transportation and communications revolutions made both goods and 
information broadly accessible.  In doing so, they laid a foundation not only 
for widespread economic betterment and wider intellectual horizons but also 
for political democracy; in newspapers and magazines, in post offices, in 
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nationwide movements to influence public opinion, and in mass political 
parties.”  (Howe 2009)  Similar to the savings seen in furnishings, the ability 
to access and transmit information without going through the single node of 
the town minister to coordinating over vast distances allowed for two models 
of collective action.  First, a centralized agent could disperse information to 
satellite sects, and, more importantly, receive information back from those 
sects quickly to adapt to a changing marketplace.  This is the method by 
which political parties could operate on a national scale.  Second, numerous 
regional institutions could develop and be far more effective through learning 
from the methods of similar institutions in different locales.  These regional 
institutions could also have agendas and topics for discussion through direct 
access to information instead of going through the intermediary of a town 
minister.  Both models—the franchise system of political parties and regional 
collectives largely favored by professional organizations—leveraged the newly 
acquired ability to undermine the established ministers through accessing 
information with far less cost created through technological progress.  
 
Chapter 1.4: Political and religious institutions 
The clash or consensus of American social groups, distinguished 
largely in economic terms--a ‘middle class’ defined by, “the predominant role 
of economic and materialistic interests,”--for Huntington is juxtaposed with a 
unified American social structure, rallying around common ideals.  
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(Huntington 1981, p. 9)  While this anti-egalitarian impulse is a common 
recruitment tactic of secular and religious groups, the centrality of the church 
to social and political life distinguished and divided men across the economic 
spectrum. While both secular and religious institutions appealed to the same 
narrative, their interpretation and definition of anti-egalitarianism differed 
so significantly that a single ‘American creed’ cannot be considered to exist.  
Egalitarianism for political parties was nominally defined as a limit upon the 
coercive power of government and control of social life.  For religious 
denominations, anti-egalitarianism was defined as an opposition to the 
meddling influence of commercial interests and political cabals (including 
Van Buren’s Tammany gang) and control of a secular, social establishment.  
Instead, control over social life by religious groups was seen as a moralizing 
influence and as a community of piety rather than control by an elite group of 
clergy.   
When religious groups were the dominant social and political group, 
they behaved both as interest groups and as firms.  The contemporary view 
differentiating parties from interest groups characterizes parties as 
maintaining themselves through market exchange—like firms--and as 
producing collective goods, while compensating participants indirectly--like 
interest groups.  (Schlesinger 1984) Such a view legitimizes Anthony Downs’ 
claim that the goal of political parties is to gain and maintain power, “rather 
than gain office to pursue policies.” (Schlesinger 1984, Downs 1957)  The 
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communication and information monopoly is the key to understanding how 
religious elites maintained power, as a substitute for secular competitors 
entering the market—rather than merely state sponsorship which only 
offered sponsored religious denominations an advantage over religious 
competitors and, as shown in contemporary European cases, does not 
correlate with control over social or political functions.  Disestablishment 
created a market for religious services, but technology created a market for 
information and communication goods.   
While each sociopolitical organization competing for the resources of 
citizens attempted to claim the position as the true and legitimate protector 
of the ‘American Creed’, the proper structure of such an organization was a 
point of contention.  These structures are not merely a means of fulfilling a 
commonly understood American creed, but their differences speak to 
divergent interpretations of the narrative.  Specifically, state sponsored 
denominations viewed religious participation as a moralizing influence, the 
ideological precursor to mandatory public education and state-enforced 
temperance movements.  Secular institutions—specifically political parties—
appealed to anti-egalitarian impulses nominally arguing for a belief in the 
Christian faith but against the power of an established clergy and instead 
recognizing secular institutions to fulfill secular goals—such as literacy—
instead of moralization through participation in a rigorously structured 
church of a particular denomination. Differences in interpretation of the role 
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of government between secular and religious actors is not merely a difference 
of degree along a two dimensional spectrum measuring the extent to which 
government should exist in the lives of individuals, but a difference of kind as 
the role of government in supporting the moral and social development of 
actors and creating a particular public sphere for social and political action. A 
difference in views of the organization that should be at the center of social 
and political life thereby results in a difference in a common American creed, 
and while Schlesinger and Huntington respectively relegate and ignore this 
difference to religious groups as responsible for the sphere of religious life, I 
argue the competition between denominations and political actors as the 
central forum and actors of social and political life results in two 
fundamentally different American creeds.  Moreover, both authors focus on 
slavery as the primary difference splitting the nation prior to the civil war 
and technological advances—while creating an industrial class—as only 
developing after the civil war.  Yet transportation and technological 
innovations make the cleavage possible prior to 1800, and the competition is 
most explicit in the Sabbatarian movement, again discounted by Schlesinger 
and ignored by Huntington. 
 
Chapter 1.5: Monopolistic firms 
Charles Lindblom argues that in competitive political arenas multiple 
actors can compete for power, yet when a single group (or, in the case of the 
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United States, two political parties) gains a crucial institutional advantage, 
they can leverage that advantage to completely exclude competitors. 
(Lindblom 1977)  In the case of the Van Buren’s Democratic party from 1828-
1835, such an advantage existed.  Religious groups, who attempted to 
influence politics through political stances formed within their theological 
framework, were marginalized both under the ‘Era of Good Feelings’ and the 
Jacksonian/Van Buren political monopoly, as no effective alternative party 
existed to be lobbied.  Yet stepping back from Lindblom’s characterization of 
a political oligarchy that could exclude potentially meddlesome groups, a 
competition amongst political and religious institutions not for control of the 
political process, state bureaucracy, or implementation of particular policy, 
but over the distribution of information and the national narrative—the 
topics that individuals knew other individuals were educated about, and 
therefore the topics that were discussed by citizens, existed.  The result of 
successful domination of the flow of information was not only a political and 
bureaucratic success, but an increase in the share of resources citizens 
invested in the type--whether secular or religious--of discussion and activity.   
Adam Smith recognized the benefits of disestablishing religious 
institutions from state sponsorship in The Wealth of Nations,1 making the 
argument that would not be made in earnest until the 1980s by economists of 
religion, that a religious market would 1) have a moderating effect upon 
religious violence through a multitude of religious organizations, and 2) 
                                                 
1 Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations.  New York: CreateSpace Publishing.  (2009) 
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create a clergy responsive to the needs and desires of parishioners instead of 
lethargy and atrophy due to state sponsorship. The ‘religious market’ is not in 
fact merely a market for religion—that is, the ideological and theological 
doctrine offered to parishioners each Sunday—but the entry by religious sects 
into the larger market to distribute intangible goods in the form of ideology 
and the social and political infrastructure through which individuals could 
formulate their own lives.  Smith argued state sponsorship inspired religious 
practitioners to encourage violence to maintain their privileged position.  
“Each ghostly [religious] practitioner, in order to render himself more 
precious and sacred in the eyes of his retainers, will inspire them with the 
most violent abhorrence of all other sects, and continually endeavour, by 
some novelty, to excite the languid devotion of his audience.”  (Smith V.1.196)  
Smith turned to the American case, recognizing that even the most 
conservative and pious of American denominations were moderate in their 
social and political stances due to competition and a plethora of options for 
parishioners.   
If it had been established, though of a very unphilosophical origin, it 
would probably by this time have been productive of the most 
philosophical good temper and moderation with regard to every sort of 
religious principle. It has been established in Pennsylvania, where, 
though the Quakers happen to be the most numerous, the law in 
reality favours no one sect more than another, and it is there said to 
have been productive of this philosophical good temper and 
moderation. (Smith V.1.196) 
Smith’s argument that competitive markets increase efficiency and 
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responsiveness would have been far more obvious in European religious 
denominations than emerging economic markets as religious institutions 
controlled the flow of information and most social and political institutions in 
Europe--as well as the United States--during his lifetime.   
But though this equality of treatment should not be productive of this 
good temper and moderation in all, or even in the greater part of the 
religious sects of a particular country, yet provided those sects were 
sufficiently numerous, and each of them consequently too small to 
disturb the public tranquillity, the excessive zeal of each*145 for its 
particular tenets could not well be productive of any very harmful 
effects, but, on the contrary, of several good ones: and if the 
government was perfectly decided both to let them all alone, and to 
oblige them all to let alone one another, there is little danger that they 
would not of their own accord subdivide themselves fast enough so as 
soon to become sufficiently numerous. (Smith V.1.198) 
The catalysts for the organizational implications from the disestablishment of 
religion in New England to the entrenchment of the second party system—
culminating with the election of Martin Van Buren--and beginning with the 
election of Andrew Jackson in 1828--are numerous and varied and include a 
massive influx of immigrants, expansion of the franchise to nearly all white 
males, increasing tensions between the north and south.  Yet the most 
popular explanations for the second great awakening lie in the notion of the 
rhetorical flair of its leaders and an expansion of evangelism due to a 
liberalization of doctrinal requirements for ministers and geographical 
expansion.  These explanations are incorrect and recognize a lack of research 
and understanding, yet continue to be pervasive as popular understandings 
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of the period.  Smith’s contentions from two centuries prior to Schlesinger are 
completely ignored, and an investigation of the institutions that gave rise to 
parties and increased religious consumption—the ability to create a national 
narrative through technological advancement—is not researched.   
 
Chapter 1.6: Disestablishment and Congregational market share 
The loss of market share for the Congregational Church was not 
primarily due to disestablishment and competition from alternative religious 
organizations--particularly the ‘fire and brimstone’ revivalists who 
characterize the Second Great Awakening in popular historical accounts of 
the early nineteenth century, represented in this essay by Schlesinger’s 
influential work on early American political development.  Instead, the loss 
in market share is attributable transportation innovations that allowed 
secular institutions—specifically political parties—to create a national 
narrative and undermine traditional forums--the Sunday sermon and the 
physical church building--for communication and the dissemination of 
information to entire communities.  The compliment of technological 
advances to disestablishment and the advent of new political institutions 
account for the increase in consumption of religious services and a rise in 
secular political organizations, rather than a religious ‘spirit’ or an exclusive 
market for religious services.  I demonstrate what is characterized as ‘failure 
to innovate’ and compete in the religious market after disestablishment was 
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not in fact a failure by the Congregational Church, but a misinterpretation of 
the goals of church leaders.  The Congregational Church utilized its resources 
to fend off efforts by its most similar theological opponent—the Unitarians—
and the secular allies of the Unitarians, political parties and commercial 
interests of leading Unitarians.  Whereas Schlesinger and popular historians 
characterize this Second Party System as an outgrowth of tensions and 
disagreements that shattered the ‘era of good feelings’, it was instead an 
attempt to gain political power through creating a national dialogue that for 
the first time allowed enterprising political actors to undermine traditional 
nodes of communication through the efficient distribution of partisan 
publications.  Adam Smith recognized the desire of political actors to control 
their constituent’s political allegiances, and Van Buren’s alliance with the 
Unitarians in New England was meant to undermine the political influence 
of the Congregationalists.  “But it is quite otherwise in countries where there 
is an established or governing religion. The sovereign can in this case never 
be secure unless he has the means of influencing in a considerable degree the 
greater part of the teachers of that religion.” (Smith V.1.205)   
The aims of contemporary researchers in the history of religion and 
American political development rely on the wrong variable to measure the 
‘success’ of denominations—and the threats to success that traditional 
religious denominations, particularly the Congregational Church--after 
religious disestablishment.  Many authors—including Finke and Stark—
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treat Congregationalists as, “Firms competing within an unregulated 
religious economy, [and] seek to understand why the upstart sects won.” 
[italics mine]  (Finke and Stark 1989, p. 27)2  Piu-Yan Lam finds that 
Protestant societies with a pluralistic and open religious marketplace 
produce greater levels of social action and political involvement by citizens 
than societies dominated by a single, state sponsored religious institution 
(Lam 2006), and Trejo demonstrates a strong, positive correlation between a 
vibrant market of religious services and efforts for social reform and protest 
organized by clergy on behalf of the underserved in Latin America.  (Trejo 
2009)  While contemporary statistical analysis attempts in the scientific and 
economic study of religion disproves Schlesinger’s ignorance of the causes of 
the Second Great Awakening, most such researchers accept Schlesinger’s 
metric for success and failure of religious organizations—that is, a rise in 
membership and market share.   
In order to analyze and differentiate winning and losing 
denominations, Starke and Finke, “in marketing terms, analyze 1) their 
organizational structure (denominational polity); 2) their sales 
representatives (clergy); 3) their product (religious message); and 4) their 
marketing (evangelical techniques).”  Yet the notion that the goals of 
denominations may be distinct from the desire to increase membership is 
ignored from this analysis, and most contemporary investigations into early 
                                                 
2 Finke, Roger and Rodney Stark.  “How the Upstart Sects Won America: 1776-1850.”  Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion. 28(1). (1989) 
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American churches.  If the product a denomination offered was in fact 
exclusivity—and association with only a select social, political, and economic 
class—then a denomination would artificially create a cap on the number of 
its flock.  Further, if a denomination required achievement of academic 
standards for its clergy, the membership of the congregational would be 
limited by the number of ministers available.  As proof of a ‘failure’ by the 
Congregational church, Finke and Stark state, “From 1776 to 1850, 
Congregationalist market share in New England dropped from 63% to 27%, 
while their total dropped from 20.4% to 4.0% nationwide during the same 
span.  Yet, despite a five-fold decline in market share, total Congregational 
membership increased from 85,177 to 313, 252 during the seventy-four year 
span.” (Starke Finke 1989 p 31)  Yet the conclusion of some failure of effort 
does not follow from these statistics.  Alternative definitions of success—
particularly the ability of Congregational ministers to secure their social and 
political positions in a time of great religious and social upheaval—as well as 
the ability to increase overall membership despite a loss of market share—
certainly do not indicate any failure by the church.  Moreover, as Finke and 
Stark state, traditional Protestant denominations have, “dominated religious 
discourse through their control of the elite seminaries and their near 
monopoly on ‘respectful’ media coverage—and they have written nearly all 
the influential histories of American religion.  Nevertheless, by early in the 
19th century, these were bodies in decline.  Ironically, their decline was 
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caused by their inability to cope with the consequences of religious freedom.” 
(Finke Stark 1989, p. 28)  Thus, I examine the efforts of the Congregational 
ministry during both the so-called second great awakening and second party 
system, to determine their objectives and whether or not they achieved them.  
I conclude the greatest threats to the Congregational Church were the 
technological developments which gave rise to secular political parties that 
detracted from the social control afforded the Congregationalists even after 
disestablishment through their ability to serve as a hub of the flow of 
information in otherwise isolated communities.   
The fundamental shift in communication that occurred during the first 
half of the nineteenth century was the ability of citizens to access information 
from an impersonal source.  Whereas subsequent developments would 
increase the speed at which information was disseminated, the distribution of 
printed media to post offices that also served as salons for discussion of that 
news, allowed citizens without personal ties other geographic areas to both 
access information through newspapers and know their peers also had access 
to that information, allowing for discussion about current events.   
 
  
 
Chapter 2: Communication infrastructure as the source of early 
American social and political institutional development 
 
Control of the routes and content of communication determined social 
control in New England from the nation’s founding. The late 18th and early 
19th century lacked a unified national dialogue due to the technological 
limitations of communication. The approach of religious denominations to 
new technology not only was determined by the theological, social, and 
economic aims of the organizations, but the engagement with the new 
technology that impacted the functioning of the denomination itself.  
Engaging and utilizing a new technology—and particularly in the case of the 
ability to create and distribute literature on a national scale—directly 
effected the actions and behaviors of denominations and their leaders.  
Determinations regarding the issues to address, the shifts in theology, the 
limits of dissent within the denomination, and the geographic diversity of the 
denomination, all were influenced by the engagement with and the ability to 
utilize a nation-wide communication infrastructure.  Thomas Boomershine 
writes, “The primary task in the education of the Church’s primary leaders is 
the mastery of the most powerful medium of communication and of the 
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interpretative systems by which the Word of God can be made present in that 
medium.” (Boomershine 1989) Certainly control over the flow of information 
is strongly correlated to social, economic, and political control to this day, but 
at the turn of the 19th century, personal connections were necessary to access 
information outside of a citizen’s immediate geographic region.   
 
Chapter 2.1: Mass communication theory 
 Mass communication theory offers an explanation of the power of 
control over the flow of information as not merely the commonly assumed 
ability to deliver a message to each individual efficiently, but rather the 
ability to determine what each individual knows each other individual knows.  
This is powerful as it determines the topics about which individuals may 
converse.  While Thomas Jefferson only recognizes the popular assumption, 
contending individuals may judge arguments for themselves and their 
neighbor’s views do not influence his own, he fails to conceive of the power of 
mass communication in determining the bounds of topics for discourse.   
“Thomas Jefferson, arguing for religious toleration, held that whether his 
neighbor believes in no god or in twenty gods, makes no difference to him: “It 
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” This argument—that culture 
does not work because it makes no ‘real’ material difference—relies on the 
same cultural distinction as a child’s retort.  How much can it be believed? Is 
W.H. Auden right that ‘poetry makes nothing happen?” (Schudson 154) Even 
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granting Jefferson’s conclusion--that what a community believes does not 
influence what an individual believes—the beliefs of neighbors influences the 
knowledge and media they consume, thereby defining the boundaries of 
topics individuals may discuss.  Yet Jefferson’s own actions indicate a belief 
in the power of the transmission of ideas and the importance of the control of 
the nodes of distribution.  Under Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Postmaster General 
Granger, “declined to appoint Republican printers to 
postmasterships…instructed his deputies in 1804 to encourage subscribers to 
take ‘newspapers published in their own states and neighborhoods, rather 
than those which are published at a distance.’ Granger enumerated three 
advantages in promoting country papers.  First, as a Jefferson appointee, his 
assumption that the rural press would be less partisan, or at least less 
Federalist, in its influence.  Second, he noted, bookstores were usually allied 
with print shops and promoting the latter would increase the former, 
extending a ‘knowledge of letters’ in the young republic.  Third, and most 
pragmatically, carrying papers from distant cities cost the post office 
considerably more than delivering country papers in their neighborhoods.  
The admonition to promote the country’s papers remained part of postal 
instructions at least until 1820.”1 (Kielbowicz 43) 
 
 
                                                 
1 Kielbowicz, Richard.  News in the Mail: The Press, Post Office and Public Information, 1700-1860s.  
Greenwood Press. (1989) 
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Chapter 2.2: Communication in rural New England 
The individuals outside of urban areas most likely to have such a social 
network were clergy trained at either at Yale or Harvard and sent to minister 
in an outlying community.  While slow to evolve and imprecise, relatively 
timely information could only be gathered by individuals living outside the 
immediate domain of an urban area through tapping personal connections, 
returning to the city, or interacting with others traveling through town.  The 
only individuals in rural areas of New England at the turn of the 19th century 
and prior who would have such an extensive social network--largely based in 
an urban area,--who would have the means and time to travel regularly, and 
who would be guaranteed to meet any visitor to their rural area, would be the 
clergy.  The ‘second great awakening’ is the result of new religious sects and 
untrained clergy being able to tap into a national dialogue, and provide their 
flock with a social experience that included the topics of the day through such 
an effort, by the technological innovations in printing and transportation that 
for the first time made an expansive personal social network not necessary to 
gain access to and participate in a national dialogue.  For the first time the 
vast social networks established and entrenched by the clergies of Yale and 
Harvard could be usurped by common men to access news and 
communications. 
 One of the difficulties of mounting a successful, mass opposition to a 
monopolistic sociopolitical institution is the inability to know what others 
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know—due to the restrictions upon mass distribution of information--as well 
as the difficulty in establishing an effective ‘echo chamber’.  A monopoly over 
this echo chamber existed for New England Congregationalists through a 
combination of state sponsorship and ministers serving as informational 
gatekeepers due to the technological inability to transport news efficiently (as 
well as physical forums for discussion of that news).  When forums for 
discussion are absent—either due to the lack of a physical meeting place or 
coercive punishment for dissent—individuals can neither reinforce messages 
of dissent (the ‘echo chamber’ is lacking) and thereby cement opposition 
through repetition, nor create knowledge through discussion and dissent.  
The creation of a national dialogue through technological advancement, as 
well as the dismantling of state-sponsored religious institutions (which, 
although largely lacking coercive punishments for attendance of their 
particular denomination, did require attendance of some approved church 
thereby limiting alternative activities on the Sabbath) combined to create an 
American iteration of the echo chamber.  Whereas salons, lyceums, 
universities, and institutions facilitating debate existed for millennia, the 
true populist innovation of America was constructing such institutions open 
to the masses.   
The Congregational minister’s sermon effectively transmitted 
information and cultural values through monopolizing mass communication 
during religious establishment.  “Where the public congregation and the 
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private readerships reinforced each other, they successful engendered a 
Protestant worldview.”  (Marty p. 102)  The echo chamber created by 
Congregational ministers combined public information with private 
consumption of religious texts, encouraging both attendance of sermons and 
individual study.  Congregants found utility not only in the theological 
message and access to common knowledge, but also in the transmission of 
communal values.  Transmission of such values was an individual good—that 
is, it did not necessarily need the echo chamber of communal discussion to be 
useful to individuals.  Common knowledge, however, provided access to 
communal discussions, while theology fulfilled the most obvious role of the 
church.   
“When a speaker is addressing an audience, the members of the 
audience normally become a unity, with themselves and with the 
speaker.  If the speaker asks the audience to read a handout provided 
for them, as each reader enters into his or her own private reading 
world, the unity of the audience is shattered, to be reestablished only 
when oral speech begins again.  Writing and print isolate.  There is no 
collective noun or concept for readers corresponding to; audience…to 
think of readers as a unified group, we have to fall back on calling 
them an ‘audience’, as though they were in fact listeners…Still, a 
textually supported religious tradition can continue to authenticate the 
primacy of the oral in many ways.  In Christianity, for example, the 
Bible is read aloud at liturgical services.  For God is thought of always 
as ‘speaking to human beings, not as writing to them.”  (Ong 1982) 
 
 
Chapter 2.3: Liberalization of mass communication 
 Whereas previously only individuals wealthy or privileged enough to 
possess leisure time engaged in such activities (and coercively controlled the 
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state apparatus, thereby rendering only their decisions applicable to mass 
instilment through legislation) the democratic process allowing for mass 
participation greatly expanded the influence of individuals without such 
wealth or privilege and rendered their political involvement relevant.  “A 
rhetorically effective object must be relevant to and resonant with the life of 
the audience…rulers cannot successfully impose culture on people unless the 
political symbolism they choose connects to underlying native traditions.”  
(Schudson “How Culture Works” 167)  Each of these traditions developed in 
geographically dispersed communities, as information was not efficiently 
distributed to each community outpost in a timely manner.   
“”Information and symbols flowing from one place to another 
integrated a loosely knit society characterized by Robert Wiebe as a 
nation of ‘island communities.’ The mails brought the outside world to 
people in the guise of national political news, market data, reports of 
social activities, and even entertainment.  Although the proximate, 
tangible institutions of local life probably did the most to directly shape 
people’s views, public information in the mail maintained linkages 
with other levels of the nation’s social organization.” (Kielbowicz 7) 
 
Prior to the establishment of a national postal service, relatively infrequent 
travelers carried news and information and direct communication--which 
often took weeks or months--between men with social networks that 
traversed vast geographic territory.  Early technology, such as stagecoaches--
impossible in the south as roads could not handle the weight of the vehicles--
began fledgling service in the northeast in 1785, but only traveled on the 
main post line to Newburyport, MA. (Kielbowicz 46) The relationship 
between technology and the flow of information was not linear; in fact, 
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numerous technological advances entrenched the power of urban centers in 
their access to news--thereby increasing the importance and value of news as 
it became more timely and detailed while still limiting access to that 
information from individuals living anywhere outside of urban areas.  Thus, 
citizens in rural areas (even townships located very close to urban centers) 
either had to move to the city or rely further upon the power of individuals 
within their town to access their professional and social networks to gain and 
distribute information.  Newspapers were often the first discarded by 
stagecoach postmen when their coaches became immobile due to improperly 
kept roads.  Damaged and undelivered newspapers prompted the United 
States Postmaster to rely largely upon ships to deliver mail, which only 
reinforced the advantage coastal towns and urban centers--regarding the 
supply of news and information--and those living even marginally outside of 
such areas reliance upon personal social networks to gain access to 
information largely based in urban areas.  (Hecht 64)2   
 Even in 1806, Massachusetts Federalist Fisher Ames complained from 
Dedham--a town located close to Boston--as living in an, “area destitute of 
information. Here we sit in darkness and instead of having the light of the 
newspapers, the only light men can see to think by, we often have to wait, as 
they do in Greenland, for the weather and the northern lights.” (Ames 357)  
Politicians in both the north and south recognized the power of a national 
                                                 
2 Hecht, Arthur. “Government-Owned and Operated Coastwise Mail Service of the Eighteenth Century.”  
American Neptune (Jan 1962)  
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communications system, and its implication for usurping traditional power 
structures through direct communication with constituents—and the ability 
to foment democratic action (and a focus upon political issues) in both urban 
areas and rural communities alike by allowing men to discuss issues in a 
setting other than church. “The mails thus partly satisfied the appetite for 
news among subscribers and nonsubscribers alike.  Coffeehouses formalized 
the practice of newspaper sharing...News in the mail, however, was more than 
a partisan weapon; it played a part in sustaining the republic through a 
period of fragile national unity.  John Calhoun’s vision of a postal system that 
would allow, ‘a citizen of the West to read the news of Boston still moist from 
the press’ was substantially realized.” (italics added)(Kielbowicz 49-50, 
Calhoun 401)3 
 John Lambert, in his Travels Through Lower Canada and the United 
States, expresses the commotion caused by the arrival of news during the 
first years of the 19th century—a commotion that clearly irked local 
clergymen as they witnessed their authority and ability to control the 
attention of townspeople as the sole purveyor of outside information (as well 
as the only event in town on Sundays).  
“It was entertaining to see the eagerness of the people on our arrival, to 
get a sight of the last newspaper from Boston.  They flocked to the post 
office and the inn, and formed a variety of groups round those who were 
fortunate enough to possess themselves a paper.  There is scarcely a 
poor owner of a miserable log hut, who lives on the border of the stage 
road, but has a newspaper left at his door…Without a knowledge of 
                                                 
3 Calhoun, John C. “Speeches on Internal Improvements.” Papers of John C. Calhoun.  University of South 
Carolina Press: Columbia, SC. (1970) 
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what is being passed in the world, man may be said to be an 
isolated being; but with a newspaper before him, he mixes with 
society, hears the opinions of others, and may communicate his 
sentiments upon men and things to all parts of the world.” 
(emphasis added) (Lambert, Travels through Lower Canada and the 
United States, 472.  Also Kielbowicz 47)4 
 
Whereas, “the college suited the older tradition of Puritan rhetoric [and] 
Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Episcopalians shared the Renaissance 
tradition of the learned ministers,” (Miller p, 179) the methods of founders of 
the party establishment are consistent with Marxist critiques of religion 
(and, more generally, of symbols and culture) as they criticized the existing 
religious establishment as elitist and attempted to bring instill populist 
principles into religious organizations (taking a cue from the evangelical 
revivals that marked the Second Great Awakening) to undermine existing 
sociopolitical institutions.  Political parties were the vehicles by which they 
organized the masses and mobilized the electorate to gain political power; 
alternative social institutions that could be leveraged to aid in this endeavor 
certainly were co-opted, and those that stood in their way were criticized and 
attempted to be dismantled.  In describing the Marxist critique of culture, 
Schudson states, “Ideas and symbols or propaganda successfully manipulate 
                                                 
4 Lambert, John. Travels Through Lower Canada and the United States. Richard Phillips: London. (1810)  
Lambert is critical of the physical conditions in which rural Americans lived, but favorably compares their 
intellectual condition to men of similar status in Europe. “I am of the opinion that this general circulation of 
newspapers throughout America tends very much to the instruction of the country people, and divests them 
of that air of ignorance and rusticity which characterize the greater part of the peasantry in Europe.  The 
knowledge acquired by newspapers may be superficial, but it gives men a general acquaintance with the 
world. It sets before them the actions of their countrymen, and the government under which they live; it 
renders them familiar with transactions of foreign nations; and though confined to a small spot themselves, 
yet at one view they become acquainted with every section of the globe.” (Lambert 472) 
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people.  ‘Ideology’ (or the somewhat more slippery term ‘hegemony’) is viewed 
as a potent agent of powerful ruling groups, successfully molding the ideas 
and expectations and presuppositions of the general population and making 
people deferent and pliable…”5 (Schudson 155) 
The Congregational church still would could have controlled social and 
political life in New England had its monopoly on the flow of information 
remained; while individuals could choose their own denomination, 
connections to society outside of a rural village would have still been largely 
controlled by the clergy.  Thus, the technological revolution gave rise to 
timely and affordable information throughout New England that truly 
allowed citizens to no longer rely upon the Congregational church for a 
connection to social and political life.  In fact, while new denominations and 
preachers attempted to recruit new members from the ranks of former 
Congregationalists, or parishioners of the Congregational church to whom 
membership was not extended but attendance was compulsory, a new 
entity—the political party--utilized the ability to create a engage national 
discourse and the democratic political apparatus of the United States, along 
with the dismantling of social controls instituted by the Congregational 
church, to gain political power on a national scale and dissemble political 
allegiance based solely primarily geography and allegiances to individual 
political figures.  Of course, factors too numerous to list—including 
immigration, the expansion of the franchise, the urbanization of America, 
                                                 
5 Schudson, Michael.  “How Culture Works.” Theory and Society. (1989) 
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expanding economic opportunities and a fledgling American middle class—
changed the electoral and political landscape of America during the early 19th 
century.  Yet without the ability to transcend geographic communities 
through a unifying dialogue made possible by technological advances, only 
those with an expansive personal network would have continued to be able to 
control the flow of information--(and therefore the domains of social and 
political life--in America.   
 As the nodes of information distribution are increased in number and 
span greater geographic distance, allowing for instant feedback and 
communal discussion thereby consumers of information into producers, the 
tangible power of the clergy as a switchback of information distribution 
lessens and the mere attendance and adherence to religious principles 
becomes a way for individuals to self-identify and access the benefits of 
association with those symbols.  In more contemporary lingo, the association 
with and consumption of religious services—as the tangible benefits decrease 
and association becomes increasingly voluntary, as well as the choice of 
which religious institution to attend expands, the benefits are encapsulated 
in association—rather than the tangible goods gained through participation.  
In contemporary parlance, the symbols created by institutions turn those 
institutions into brands.  With greater choice the cost of creating an 
alternative institution diminished, and the value of establishing an 
institution with comparative value also increased.   
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Neither the disestablishment of religious institutions nor the 
expansion of the flow of information were sufficient to allow for alternative 
sociopolitical organizations to flourish, but both were necessary to 
marginalize religious institutions to control only moral life in New England, 
frame future political debates in theological terms (rather than claim 
authority over all social, political, and economic issues), and allow for 
political parties to rise and fill the power vacuum created after the 
disestablishment of religious institutions while those denominations fought 
amongst themselves for members and further relevance in a rapidly changing 
America.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 3:  The goals and strategies of Congregational Church in 
New England communal life. 
After the American Revolution, the First Amendment’s declaration of 
separation of church and state is commonly thought to have disestablished all 
state-sponsored religions in the United States.  Yet most New England states 
maintained state support of the Congregational Church into the first half of 
the 19th century.  Whereas the Anglican church lost state sponsorship in 
southern states immediately following American independence, the 
Congregationalists supported the American revolutionaries, whereas the 
Anglicans—later rebranded as the Episcopalian Church and dominant in the 
southern states—largely supported their the British and their theological 
brethren in the Church of England.  Loyalists—politically marginalized and 
suspect in the south—clearly could not establish state sponsorship, whereas 
the state support for the Congregational church was not finally dismantled 
until 1833 (the final state to do so being Massachusetts.)   
The Congregational Church’s drop in market share after its 
disestablishment was neither a failure to compete in the new religious 
market place nor primarily due to competing religious institutions.1  Rather, 
                                                 
1 Religious ‘institutions’ are defined as denominations or sects that, for membership, mandate, “rules for 
individual expression, information transmittal, and social choice.”  (Plott 1979)  In the case of the 
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technological advances undermined the Congregational Church’s traditional 
power—a monopoly over the flow of information in communities—and 
allowed secular institutions to develop that competed directly with the 
Congregational Church for control over the distribution of information and 
discourse in New England.  The shift in form and function of traditional 
religious institutions was not fueled by differentiations in doctrine but the 
technological advances that allowed for a cohesive national discourse, the 
power vacuum created by the dismantling of state-sponsored religions, who 
did not evangelize but rather relied upon an elite membership and required 
attendance in order to ‘moralize’ the masses, and commercial interests who 
bank-rolled movements in opposition of traditional denominations.  I focus on 
Connecticut as it was the center of the training of Congregational clergy 
during the early nineteenth century.  Connecticut not only was home to Yale, 
the primary training ground for Congregational ministers, but also 
disestablished the Congregational Church in 1818, during the height of what 
is popularly characterized as the second great awakening and the beginning 
                                                 
Congregational church, three levels of institutions exist.  First, rules for leadership are mandated by 
attendance and graduation from a ‘designated’ university—the ‘designation’ of which is informally 
enforced by other members of the clergy and the community that hires a Congregational minister.  During 
the time of religious establishment, Harvard and Yale served as the two primary training programs for 
Congregational ministers.  Second, periodical Congregational conventions were organized on state and 
regional basis, for example annually in Massachusetts and less frequently in Pennsylvania, New York, 
Connecticut, and New Hampshire.  These conventions were more frequent amongst the revivalist and 
evangelical congregations, but also more informal.  Informal rules for communication will be explored in 
this essay, and the rules surrounding that dissemination of information defined the power of the 
Congregational church prior to mass media publication and efficient distribution.  Finally, rules were 
defined by local sects and ministers and enforced both by the local minister and through social pressures by 
local congregants.  As citizens had greater access to information without filtration by the local minister, and 
as congregants gained control of the financing of their local sect, power shifted in enforcement and 
establishment of rules from ministers to the collective congregation.   
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of the second party system.  I argue these events are not unrelated but both 
came about through technological advances that allowed the distribution of 
information that created a national dialogue which facilitated foreign, 
untrained preachers and centrally organized political parties to relate and 
communicate over vast geographic distance.   
 
Chapter 3.1: Congregational maintenance of sociopolitical control 
Even though the Democratic Party was not competitive in Connecticut, 
the introduction of an influential national political scene, and, in the election 
of 1824 for the first time a competitive presidential election not featuring the 
nation’s founders, thereby generating new current news about a common 
topic throughout the nation, created an alternative narrative about which 
citizens could debate without accessing information through during their 
Sunday sermon. Therefore, the Congregational Church spent resources on 
political activities that differentiated it from the secular interests of the 
Unitarians and political parties—specifically, Sabbatarianism, a movement 
that also attempted to stunt the growth of a national narrative and disrupt 
the Congregational clergy’s monopoly over information distributed on 
Sunday. 
 The Congregational establishment ran state elections and was 
responsible for counting votes, and after disestablishment Congregational 
control of political positions in Connecticut was maintained.  
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Congregationalists did not—as commonly believed—lose control over the 
machinations of government, and even contemporarily, “in 1987 
Congregationalists, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians accounted for the 
religious affiliation of 25% of US Senators and Representatives but could 
claim the loyalties of only 7% of the population.  In contrast, Baptists account 
for more than 20% of American religious affiliation, but only 10% of those in 
Congress.” (Finke Stark 1989, p 28)  While the communication advantages of 
state sponsorship established and maintained Congregational power in New 
England, more obvious and coercive methods also aided immediate control of 
the church over political and social affairs in the region.  Their loss in power 
was certainly not due to a lack of control over the state’s political affairs, and 
the church did not expend great resources maintaining such positions.  
Rather, individual politicians--rather than the church--directly benefited 
from the lingering effects of establishment even after 1818, and while the 
church certainly benefitted from having its members in positions of power 
these advantages were not the primary concern of the Congregational church.  
In particular, the voting process in Connecticut benefited incumbents who 
were nearly universally Congregationalists.  Rules such as listing candidates 
on ballots in order of seniority, public voting, lengthy delays in the 
announcement of results, and corruption regarding the counting of ballots--
which was controlled by Congregationalists--excluded the ability of 
challengers to gain public office.  “Proxies for the election were returned in 
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April, but the result was not announced until the legislature met in May, nor 
there was any supervision compelling an honest count.  Thus it was easy to 
keep in office Federal candidates, and thus the Senate, or Council, came to 
reflect public opinion about twenty years behind the popular sentiment.”   As 
individuals were able to cast as many as twelve ballots for the legislature, 
many men simply cast early ballots—which favored established candidates.  
By 1801 voting was completely public, and “required a man to stand when 
voting for the nomination of senators.” (Greene 408)   
 
Chapter 3.2: Defining competition 
Assuming the message across denominations is similar—or at least 
similar enough for individuals in significant numbers to comfortably traverse 
denominational boundaries—the competition is not between widely disparate 
faiths but instead is amongst notably similar congregations.  The local 
Baptist church will face far more competition from a Baptist church moving 
in next door than an Islamic Mosque.  Similarly, a church with a similar 
doctrine yet a more compelling medium would also pose competition for an 
established church.  “In some ways the minister was the message.  The 
Baptist and Methodist preachers looked like ordinary men because they 
were, and their sermons could convert and convince ordinary people because 
the message was direct and clear.” (Stark and Finke 1989 p. 38)  Moreover, 
evangelical faiths--primarily referring to Methodist and Baptist 
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congregations--were able to constantly meet, and manufacture, demand.  
First, evangelical preachers did not require a degree or external qualification 
thus any number could set up shop in a given geographic area.  If one failed, 
another could attempt to sell religious services in the same space, utilizing a 
different delivery or altered message.   Moreover, the number of degrees 
granted limited the expansion of the Congregational Church--and, after a 
lengthy education, Congregational ministers fully expected to receive an 
assignment--whereas an enterprising man in a new outpost in any region of 
the country could establish a church at anytime.   Although not having a 
particularly identifiable central agency, the Congregationalists’ requirement 
of education and desire to avoid direct competition, which was enforced 
through a limited number of trained clergy, limited the need for 
centralization, the primary function of which would have been to standardize 
doctrinal issues--checked by standardized educational curriculum--and 
regional assignment.  “The Congregationalists were not nearly so 
‘congregational’ as either of the upstart sects [Methodists and 
Baptists]…Congregationalists had opted for a highly educated clergy, which 
led to a chronic shortage of pastors and maximized the bargaining power of 
the clergy.” (Finke and Stark 1989, p. 33)  Even the Methodists—now marked 
by a centralized professional clergy, at least compared to the American 
Baptists, did not have an established central agency.  During the first half of 
the 19th century, “Methodists were about as democratic locally as were the 
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Baptists.  A professional clergy had not yet centralized control of the 
Methodist organization…These Methodist amateurs did most of the 
preaching, baptizing, marrying, and burying.” (Finke and Stark, 1989 p. 33)  
Despite the lack of a centralized institutional structure, the evangelicals did 
leverage communications advances to increase membership, whereas the 
Congregationalists utilized traditional networks of power, shifting the unique 
goods offered by the Congregational church to exclusive access to interpersonal 
networking from access to exclusive news or information from abroad.   
 
Chapter 3.3: Unitarian and Congregational split at Harvard and Yale 
Coercive control certainly benefitted the Congregational 
establishment, and the concern of the Congregational clergy clearly supports 
the argument that institutions of similar theological doctrine were of greater 
concern to the Congregationalists (and, more generally, any denomination or 
congregation) than the ‘fire and brimstone’ ministers whose message and 
medium was significantly different than the theology and forum offered by 
the Congregationalists.  In particular, the Unitarian Church—whose 
influence emanated from Harvard while the Congregational hub centered on 
Yale—was a particular target of the Congregationalists in Connecticut.   
“In 1805, in the first move to indicate the depth of the developing rift 
between the clergy of the two persuasions, conservatives led by 
Connecticut-born and Yale educated Jedidiah Morse, objected to the 
appointment of Henry Ware, a liberal, to the Hollis Professorship of 
Divinity at Harvard…A central figure in the split, Morse pulled 
together various conservative, Yale-educated clergy in the Boston area 
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into a network of opposition to liberal opinion Morse’s allies by and 
large lived in outlying areas and had few connections to the Boston 
elite.  Beginning with the Ware controversy, Morse was able to 
mobilize the conservatives into rejecting fellowship with 
liberals…Despite the fact that no formal denominational split had 
taken place among liberals and conservatives, it became increasingly 
clear that an alliance had been forged among liberal religionists, 
Harvard College, and the elite business and mercantile interests of 
Boston.”  (Sellers 87) 
 
This split began with the formation of Yale Divinity School, a conservative 
reaction to what church leaders viewed as the increasingly liberal Harvard 
College.  
The conservatives were active proselytizers, supporting missionary 
societies Bible societies, young men’s associations, and a variety of 
other organizational efforts in order to convert others to their point of 
view.  The liberals were not only not evangelical, they were for the 
most part anti-evangelical until well into the 1830s, preaching the 
right of people to believe as the light of reason informed them, as long 
as they remained within the general rubric of Christianity and guided 
in some general way by the wisdom of sacred scripture.  The 
conservatives, in other words, were aggressively expansionist, the 
liberals more intent on maintaining strong institutional and civic 
leadership among groups with whom they were already entrenched. 
(Sellers 87)2 
 
Unitarians lambasted the Congregational Church as both elitist and 
undemocratic, yet largely only allowed elite, wealthy merchants to become 
members of their own denomination.  Their complaints of elitism were based 
on the stringent moral and behavioral requirements of the 
Congregationalists. “Like upstart politicians intent on mobilizing a gullible 
citizenry, the Unitarian leadership believed that these evangelicals were 
                                                 
2 Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (1981) 
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developing ‘a kind of irregular government.’ Through their pressure tactics, 
their attempts to squelch dissent through moral suasion and through statute, 
and their appeals to the unchristian and intolerant sentiments of the 
multitudes, theirs were dangerous efforts to subvert the rights of conscience 
and establish a religious dictatorship.” (Story 32)3  
Competition increased as religious institutions of a similar orthodoxy 
within a given geographic region became more numerous, therefore posing a 
split within the Congregational Church as a greater threat than the 
introduction of new evangelical faiths of different ideological leanings and 
social and theological  practices. “Competition from nearby congregations of 
the same denomination can create more pressure than competition from 
distant denominations.  A Lutheran congregation sitting among 50 similar 
Lutheran congregations in Minneapolis might face far more competition for 
members than does a lone Lutheran congregation surrounded by Baptists in 
Alabama.  When higher market shares are the result of multiple 
congregations of the same denomination, they can easily signal more rather 
than less competitive pressure.”4  (Brewer 391)  This is due to the fact an 
investment in Congregational life would be more acutely squandered by 
switching to a church of a very different ideology and practice—a 
contemporary Methodist becoming a Presbyterian will be able to quickly 
                                                 
3 Story, Ronald.  The Forging of an Aristocracy: Harvard and the Boston Upper Class, 1800-1870. (1980) 
p. 32, 24-40. 
 
4 SM Brewer, JJ Jozefowicz, RJ Stonebraker “Religious Free Riders: The Impact of Market Share”  Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion (2006) 45(3) 
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participate in the church and its practices, whereas a man who converted to 
Christianity at a tent-revival who wishes to become a Congregationalist will 
find much more of their institutional and theological knowledge inapplicable 
to their new faith.  Hostility toward the Unitarian Church was not limited to 
Congregationalists.  Lyman Beecher, with Charles Finney one of the two 
leaders most commonly associated with the Second Great Awakening, 
despised the Unitarian Church as an organ of commercial and secular 
political interests.  “Beecher himself saw Unitarians as men of ‘stratagem 
and duplicity’ who relied ‘upon wealth and the favor of the great’ to advance 
their cause.” (Pease 93) 
“’Men of affairs’ who participated most often in civic and benevolent 
societies were Unitarian.  Jane and William Pease, in an extensive 
study of occupation and church affiliation, found that the single most 
important factor associated with Unitarian.  Jane and William Pease, 
in an extensive study of occupation and church affiliation, found that 
the single most important factor associated with Unitarianism was 
wealth, the most frequently associated occupation that of merchant.  
Richard Eddy Sykes, in a study of liberal religionists in Massachusetts 
as a whole in 1800, found them associated with the people in the 
highest quartile of wealth, and disproportionately ‘engaged in trade, 
transport, and the professions,’ with Unitarian parishes through 1870 
having, ’22 times the number of lawyers, 20 times the number of 
bankers, about twice as many merchants, and approximately 28 times 
the number of manufacturers which we could have expected if their 
membership had reflected the total working population.’” (Pease 93)5 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Pease, William.  The Web of Progress: Private Values and Public Styles in Boston and Charleston, 1828-
1843. (1985) 
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Chapter 3.4: Church strictness as determinant of institutional 
strength 
Unitarians appear to have been exclusive and insular in character 
despite their religious rhetoric of inclusiveness and toleration, limiting 
themselves to members of the appropriate social class.  When the poor 
became a visible presence in Boston, the Unitarians built separate chapels for 
them, and instituted a paternalistic ‘ministry-to-the-poor.” (Pease 94)  Early 
political leaders recognized the role government played in limiting collective 
goods, and the Congregationalists convincingly argued the communal 
benefits of an established church and religious participation—most notably 
the educational and uniquely moralizing effect religious attendance instilled 
in men and children (arguments later adopted by Horace Greeley and public 
education advocates) warranted governmental support.  (Olson 1965; Ostrom 
2003)  “Congregationalists emphasized communities of believers whose 
beliefs and actions were informed by scriptural truth; Unitarians, on the 
other hand, emphasized getting along ethically with members of the 
community who might potentially hold differing beliefs.” (Johnson 88)6  The 
Unitarian Church fits the critique of collective action as its founders 
attempted to encourage participation in religious and social activities by the 
poor, huddled masses while avoiding the personal cost—in terms of the 
commitment of church attendance, Sabbath prohibitions, and adherence to 
                                                 
6 Curtis Johnson, Islands of Holiness: Rural Religion in Upstate New York, 1790-1860.  (1989) 
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the strict moral and social practices--mandated by the Congregationalists.  
The weakness of the Unitarian church, as argued by the Congregationalists 
and, contemporarily recognized as a problem of shirking individual 
responsibility and participation--stems from its inability to enforce strict 
social and moral codes while claiming to achieve the same moralizing effects 
of stricter religious sects.   
The challenge which faced both Unitarians and the evangelical 
orthodox, as the two religious groups that represented the interests 
and traditions of the propertied classes, was how to bring about the 
‘principled consensus’ in the community that legitimized values and 
beliefs as appropriate bases for society.  One did so in a way that 
embodied values of pluralism and toleration—easy values to espouse, 
so long as their wealth and position made them the hegemonic group.  
The other turned to the notion of sanctified communities of individuals 
who willed their own conversions and who could equally as well will 
the redemption of a corrupt secular order.  The first group triumphed 
in the short run in Boston.  The second articulated a view of social 
reality that, resonating with that of others in a variety of different 
geographic and social settings, led to an extraordinary wave of 
coalition building.  It was finally they who came to set the terms of 
cultural and political debate in much of the Northeast right up until 
the civil war.  7(Wright 102) 
 
As found by Finke and Stark, the liberalization of a denomination directly 
results in the erosion of that denomination’s ability to maintain membership 
and control of theological doctrine.  Yet the Unitarians served as a political 
and social entity, rather than one concerned particularly with theology and 
religious participation.  “Groups begin to those their market positions as soon 
as, and to the degree that, they become secularized.  By ‘secularized’ we mean 
                                                 
7  Wright, Conrad. The Unitarian Controversy. Boston, MA: Unitarian Universalist Association. (1994). 
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to move from otherworldliness to worldliness, to present a more distant and 
indistinct conception of the supernatural, to relax the moral restrictions on 
members, and to surrender claims to an exclusive and superior truth.  It 
follows from this definition that as groups secularize they will proselytize less 
vigorously.  It is hard to witness for a faith with nothing special to offer in the 
religious message.” (Finke Stark 1989, p. 28)  Unitarians were,  
Perfectly willing to give a wide berth to doctrinal interpretation so long 
as there was some agreement on the nature of morals and ethics—that 
is to say, on the rules governing exchange, power relationships, and 
society in general in this expanding commercial world—and so long as 
those rules were their own…The orthodox, in contrast, continued to see 
social interaction in terms of personal accountability and reliability 
that could only be guaranteed by a clear and common set of beliefs for 
which individuals had personal accountability. (Wright 101)8 
 
As the Congregational church’s members became increasing active in secular 
and political activities due to the ability to participate in a national 
conversation, government interference cemented rifts within the 
Congregational church, particularly in its control of a geographic region, and 
further shifted Harvard and Massachusetts toward Unitarianism while 
Connecticut maintained its Congregational affiliation.  “A legal ruling in 
1820 known as the Dedham decision recognized the right of the majority in 
the parish (not just the church members) to church property, thus effectively 
disenfranchising conservatives in the Boston area, who were usually in the 
                                                 
8 Wright, Conrad. Ministers, Churches, and Boston Elites 
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minority.” (Ellis 88)9  The Connecticut establishment made, “Unitarianism a 
crime according to the Connecticut statutes…The crimes against religion 
punishable by law were Blasphemy (by whipping, fine, or imprisonment); 
Atheism, Polytheism, Unitarianism, [and] Apostasy.” (Greene 420)10  A 
charge of Unitarianism was regularly leveled by Federalists against their 
Republican opponents, particularly as Republican strength grew in 
Connecticut--as the share of Methodists and Baptists grew--largely out of a 
suspicion of a Presbyterian-Congregational alliance, Jefferson’s support of 
disestablishment in Virginia, and the use of state funds for Congregational 
religious causes--particularly at Yale. 
Yet the notion that such coercive methods benefitted the 
Congregational Church’s membership numbers is misguided.  The church 
itself limited membership, through three unique methods.  First, 
Congregational ministers were required to achieve a degree in divinity--
originally the only institutions offering such degrees were Harvard, and later 
Yale.  Second, the centralization of the Congregational church and the 
interest of its ministers dictated their congregations would not geographically 
compete.  Third, even the physical Congregational churches limited members; 
whereas ministers often thought of as the ‘fire and brimstone’ preachers of 
the Second Great Awakening could hold their sermons in tents that allowed 
for massive crowds, Congregational churches—often built during the early 
                                                 
9 Ellis, George.  Half Century of the Unitarian Controversy.  (1857) 
10 Greene, Louise.  The Development of Religious Liberty in Connecticut. (2005)  
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eighteenth century and over a century old by the 1820s—limited the number 
of parishioners simply by their size. 
 
Chapter 3.5: Training methodology of non-established church leaders 
In contrast, Methodist and Baptist ministers were trained by 
apprenticeship, rather than at centralized universities, and their success was 
determined by the number of individuals they converted—rather than 
through mastery of theology and fulfillment of educational requirements.  
The circuit and apprentice system limited a young minister’s contact with 
other ministers and undermining coordination efforts both through the 
nomadic nature of evangelical ‘circuit riders’ and the inability to establish 
lasting networks through common doctrinal training and years of close 
contact.  “Methodist circuit riders in the early national period got their 
education in what they liked to call ‘Bush College,’ a seminary as large as the 
great outdoors with a curriculum as broad as the range of the human 
character they encountered in their travels.  Bush College was an 
apprenticeship system in which older itinerants recruited and trained 
younger men into the ministry as they went about their regular tasks on the 
circuit.  It was a face-to-face, word of mouth training where the basic criterion 
of success was getting people converted.” (Schneider p.141, emphasis added)   
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Chapter 3.6: Evidence addressing the lack of Congregational 
recruitment   
The Congregationalists did not increase the output of graduates from 
the Yale Theology School despite a sharp rise in population, suggesting a 
desire to increase membership was not a particularly serious concern.  
Despite the fact Connecticut’s state population rose 25 percent from 1830 to 
1850 and Yale’s enrollment increased nearly 10 percent during the same span 
(UVA 1997),11 the Yale Divinity School’s enrollment fell 24 percent. (Yale 
University 1964)12 
13 
                                                 
11 University of Virginia. “Historical Census Browser”.  
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus/ 
 
12 Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives.  “Guide to the Divinity School, Yale University.” 
Compiled Daniel Hartwig. (2008) 
 
13 Of course, myriad reasons could explain the decrease in enrollment of the Divinity School, yet the 
purpose of the graph is to demonstrate that while greater resources were invested by the college in the 
education of undergraduates—and attempts were made to increase enrollment of the undergraduate 
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Congregationalist ministers were concerned with their own financial 
stability, which trumped the desire to expand their flock.   
This shift in the distribution of social power was the result, at least in 
part, of economic factors.  The ministry had remained an office-holding 
profession offering security of tenure rather than great financial 
rewards, while law and medicine had gradually emerged during the 
eighteenth century as fee-for-service occupations which were much 
more lucrative.  By 1800 the tenuous financial position of the clergy 
was being eroded still further by changes in population distribution 
and in societal values…For most ministers the single, life-long 
pastorate of the past had now given way to a three-staged career which 
began and ended in a financially weak church; only during the prime of 
his ministry would a clergyman serve in a wealthy city-based 
congregation.14  (Cooper 210) 
 
Further, competition from both new regional sects and national-level 
denominations confronted established religious organizations—in New 
England, these were the Congregationalists.  These national denominations 
and secular institutions, to which the Congregationalists were losing market 
share, resulted in the Congregationalists having competition both from 
secular institutions—particularly political parties--aimed at diminishing the 
time and energy citizens contributed to engaging in religious activities, but 
also alternative religious options.  The Congregational response—refusing to 
dilute the social benefits of membership and keeping membership exclusive, 
                                                 
college—the Divinity School either failed to attract or educate a commiserate percentage of new ministers.  
1820-1840 certainly saw a massive increase in the number of religious leaders in the United States, yet at 
Yale a smaller percentage of undergraduates chose an education in theology than in alternative fields, as 
Divinity School enrollment failed to keep pace with overall college enrollment.   
 
14 Cooper, James F. “Enthusiasts or Democrats? Separatism, Church Government, and the Great 
Awakening in Massachusetts.”  New England Quarterly 65.2 (1992) 
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entry costs high, and membership responsibilities significant—insulated 
them from alternative religious options as the return on investment by the 
parishioner was kept significant and the loss of investment by leaving the 
church outweighed flight to alternative denominations.  Conversely, 
alternative denominations faced high rates of fluctuation as their strength 
was either focused in the charisma of the individual pastor, or the ability by a 
central authority to control competition from competing churches of the same 
denomination (or particularly similar denominations with low entry costs) 
was limited.  Therefore, even those denominations with notably high 
membership had difficulty leveraging their large number of parishioners into 
political clout as the cost of entry for a new church or pastor was not 
controlled.  The real competitors for the Congregationalists were 
organizations with strong centralization, coordination, and resources to 
launch national campaign.  Specifically, industrialists and politicians opposed 
to the attempts of Congregationalists to control the issues on the national 
agenda through limiting constant communications and instituting policies 
backed by theological authority that were in competition with the aims of 
capitalists and politicians--and, in the extreme, the politicians funded by 
capitalists. 
The evangelical movement seized upon the communications revolution, 
exploited it, and even fostered it.  Religious publishers took advantage 
of advances in the technology of printing to turn out Bibles and tracts 
by countless thousands, many of which they distributed free of charge.  
The churches also contributed heavily to a new genre of printed 
matter, the magazine.  Magazines, even more than newspapers, tended 
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to be published for specialized audiences with similar interests and 
opinions…Most of the periodicals with national circulations and 
successful publishing histories before 1840 were religious. (Howe 2009, 
p. 230) 
 
While the Congregationalists certainly lobbied for continued state 
sponsorship, the lack of interest in expanding membership and the ability to 
maintain members of social and political prominence--despite the commercial 
interests defecting to the Unitarian Church--the Congregationalists in fact 
benefitted from a tight-knit denominational structure and the uniqueness of 
the goods they offered—an elite social network, an educated clergy, and 
higher rates of giving that resulted from more direct responsiveness from a 
clergy not overwhelmed by members.  “Later studies by Zeleski and Zech 
(1995) and Perl and Olson (2000) find that small market shares are 
correlated with higher rates of giving. Both cite competitive forces as a cause 
Zaleski and Zech conclude that ‘churches are responding to the competition 
by making a greater effort to satisfy the needs of their members.  Church 
members reveal this satisfaction and religiosity by voluntarily donating 
larger contributions to their church. Perl and Olson suggest that their results 
support the argument that, ‘as the competition faced by the group increases, 
so does the religious commitment of its members.”(Brewer 390)  
As Chaves and Gorski find, “There is evidence that religious groups 
evoke more commitment from their people when they are a smaller 
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proportion of the population.”15  (Chaves and Gorski 263) Congregational 
strength actually increased as market share decreased, particularly without 
closely competing alternatives.  Congregationalists possessed two exclusive 
commodities—access to social capital developed over a century—and 
therefore individuals who would be less likely to leave the denomination or 
congregation due to pre-existing investments of time, money, and energy that 
would be lost if they switched—and trained clergy from Harvard and Yale.  
Disdain for the commercialism and liberal nature of the Unitarians drew ire 
from many religious denominations, but their threat proved minimal even 
after disestablishment.  Further, disestablishment allowed the 
Congregationalists to be critical of the emerging secular political institutions, 
fitting Adam Smith’s argument that religious institutions not dependent 
upon the ruling political elite will fervently oppose any attempts by those 
politicians to encroach upon the theological and social functions of their 
denomination.  The alliance of Van Buren and the Democrat party with 
Unitarians, a blatant attempt to undermine Congregational power, only 
exacerbated involvement of Congregationalists in politics.  
Should the sovereign have the imprudence to appear either to deride or 
doubt himself of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or from 
humanity attempt to protect those who did either the one or the other, 
the punctilious honour of a clergy who have no sort of dependency upon 
him is immediately provoked to proscribe him as a profane person, and 
to employ all the terrors of religion in order to oblige the people to 
transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince. 
(Smith V.1.206) 
                                                 
15 Chaves and Gorski, Stark & McCann 1993, Zaleski & Zech 1995, Perl & Olson 2000. 
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The secular allies of the Unitarians—national political actors—proved far 
more adept at leveraging advances in transportation infrastructure and 
media distribution  to recruit and engage members who in earlier times 
would have relied upon religious authorities for information.  As early as 
1794 intrastate communication existed in Connecticut’s largest cities, with 
the Hartford Gazette publishing, “verbatim,” the debate in Connecticut’s 
state legislature regarding sale of the western portion of the state in order to 
distribute money to citizens who suffered property damage as a result of 
British troops. (Greene 385)  Yet prior to the sale the state granted $40,000 
given to Yale College that originally, “had been collected to meet the expenses 
of the Revolutionary war.” (Greene 379)  The source of much contention was 
the state’s favoritism of Yale, the primary purpose of which was to train 
clergy of the Congregational Church.  The debate published throughout the 
state largely addressed a concern by the opposition that the funds would 
further benefit the Congregationalists.   
The ability to transport news was the single most important factor in 
changing the behavior of the Congregational establishment, forcing 
engagement as a political action committee rather than a hub with a 
monopoly on the distribution of information.  The ability to create a discourse 
through directly informing each individual citizen was the revolutionary 
change technology allowed for; whereas the only way for individuals to know 
what all others in their community knew, and therefore decide upon topics 
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with others, was through attending common public events.  These events in 
early American history were nearly exclusively Sunday sermons, and the 
minister accessed information from disparate geographic locales through a 
personal social network unavailable to other citizens.  Thus, the 
revolutionary aspect in information transportation was the ability to inform a 
mass public through informing each citizen individually and directly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 4:  Transportation revolution as disruptive sociopolitical 
force 
From the time of the nation’s founding until the technological advances 
in transportation and publishing that facilitated the access of individual 
citizens to information beyond their immediate geographic and personal 
network, communities outside of the boundaries of an urban settlement 
largely remained stagnant in terms of social, political, and economic 
conditions.  As late as 1820 little significant urbanization occurred, and the 
primary catalyst for religious liberty was pressure from the British.  The 
population of New England living in urban areas (towns with a population 
exceeding 2,500 residents) raised marginally from 1810 to 1820 (10.1% to 
10.5%), (Henretta 193)1 yet during the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
a shift in consciousness regarding current topics and a desire by citizens to 
engage in a discussion regarding national issues expanded. 
By 1815 the scale of life had shifted, grown larger and more complex. 
The centrifugal forces of trade and war, of geographic migration and 
political participation had shattered the tiny self-contained cosmos of 
the agricultural village.  Here, and especially in the more urbanized 
areas, men and women had gradually become more conscious of the 
larger social world in which they lived. …The appearance of yearly 
county fairs in Massachusetts by 1810 permitted the entire community 
                                                 
1 Henretta, James.  The Evolution of American Society, 1700-1815.  DC Heath & Co.: Lexington, MA. 
(1973) 
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of farmers to compare methods and yields and to organize for political 
purposes… (Cooper 211) 
 
Technology dramatically increased efficiency and decrease cost in terms of 
publication.  “As early as 1836, the intensification of labor under industrial 
capitalism and its consequent specializations met with the enormous 
productive potential of steam power.” (Zboray 1993 p. 196)  By the mid-
nineteenth century New York, Philadelphia, and Boston existed as the only 
major centers of literary publication, a centralization that began in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.  Thus, economies of scale aided the 
development of a national dialogue by providing economic incentives for 
newspapers to increase their distribution area, and therefore find stories that 
appealed to a wider geographic audience.  Often, “publishers faced a more 
daunting problem in finding copy for mass printing.  They did this sometimes 
by outright plagiarism of other newspaper,” thus, along with the party 
presses, incentives for standardization of news stories were also instituted.  
(Zboray 1993 p 196)  
 
Chapter 4.1: Transportation’s role in creating a national narrative 
Technological advances in transportation and media allowed for a 
national dialogue to evolve.  In 1825 John Stevens completed America’s first 
steam engine, and the Erie Canal (which gave rise to cities including Buffalo, 
Akron, and Toledo, and cemented New York City’s status as the preeminent 
 64 
American city) opened.  While railroads would allow for a truly national 
discourse (though by 1839 an over 2,000 mile trip from Pittsburgh to New 
Orleans was affordable by steamboat) the Erie Canal allowed for 
transportation and communication throughout the American northeast.  
While the first signs of the reliability, speed, and comparative affordability of 
the railroad began in the 1860s, for personal transportation, its use to 
distribute news between urban areas (and the growth in infrastructure to 
then disseminate information to rural communities began far earlier.  
Moreover, the canal system expanded the growth of new cities and the flow of 
information to those cities.  “By 1840, only four states—Arkansas, Missouri, 
Tennessee, and Vermont—had no railways running within their borders; of 
the total of almost 3,000 miles of railroad lines in place, Pennsylvania, New 
York, and Massachusetts accounted for about half.”2 (Veenendaal 4)  Whereas 
total sociopolitical power rested with the Congregationalists in New England 
through state sponsorship and control over the flow of information 
throughout the region prior to 1818, the disestablishment of religion left a 
power vacuum; where the Congregational church previously provided social 
services, control over the issues addressed and the moral life of the local 
citizenry, disestablishment allowed all men to become religious ‘free agents’, 
choosing a denomination and sect without coercive penalty from the state.   
                                                 
2 Veenendaal, Augustus.  American Railroads in the Nineteenth Century.  Greenwood Press: Westport, CT. 
(2003). 
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Politicians with federal ambitions quickly realized the political 
advantage a national infrastructure offered.  John Cahoun encouraged a 
national transportation system to, “bind the Republic together with a perfect 
system of roads and canals…The mail and the press…are the nerves of the 
body politic.  By them, the slightest impression made on the most remote 
parts, is communicated to the whole system.”3 (Calhoun 401) Such a 
transportation infrastructure was not for individual travel, but to create a 
bound nation through timely and efficient communication.  “The U.S. 
government soon realized the potential for railroads to carry the mail.  The 
first mail carry of record was in 1834.  Four years later, in 1838, Congress 
declared all railroads ‘postal routes’”4 (Daniels 18) While notable 
urbanization did not occur until the 1820s, with the percentage of New 
England citizens living in urban areas from 1820-1830 and 1830-1840 
growing to 14.0% and 19.4%, respectively, Calhoun and Jefferson’s goal of 
creating a national transportation infrastructure was the primary way to 
create a national dialogue, and federal politicians to communicate with the 
majority of Americans. (Henretta 193)5 
A network of turnpikes and railroads meant that even those places in 
New England that were once remote were becoming intimately linked 
with the market economy of the burgeoning urban centers and the 
                                                 
3 “Speech on Internal Improvements” The Papers of John C. Calhoun. Ed. Robert Meriwether (Columbia: 
Univ of South Carolina Press, 1985) p. 401 
 
4 Daniels, Rudolph.  Trains Across the Continent: North American Railroad History.  Indiana University 
Press: Bloomington, IN.  (2000) 
 
5 Henretta, James.  The Evolution of American Society, 1700-1815.  DC Heath & Co.: Lexington, MA. 
(1973) 
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sources of information that issued from it.  An explosion of the 
newspapers and periodicals occurred, bringing with it yet another 
network with Boston as its nexus.  Boston’s commercial economy grew 
in scope and complexity.  Even work rhythms and patterns changed, as 
employees began to lose the intimate (though not always pleasant) 
interpersonal relationships with employers, and as apprentices and 
journeymen became instead the workers of a new order—waged or 
salaried employees with fixed responsibilities. (Channing 92)6 
 
While “[John Quincy] Adams, [Henry] Clay, and [John C.] Calhoun all 
supported federal money on transportation,” not all federal politicians rubber 
stamped internal improvement bills. (Howe 2009 p.211) Both James Madison 
and James Monroe vetoed numerous Congressional bills providing federal 
funding for interstate transportation, usually only allowing passage of 
internal improvement bills when they could justify them as necessary for 
national security in the wake of the War of 1812.  Turnpikes provided 
unreliable transportation, with stage coaches traveling at a maximum of 
eight miles per hour on most roads, and even the most advanced turnpike 
from New York to Philadelphia ensuring transportation at only eleven miles 
per hour.  Towns located on canals—and later rivers that could accommodate 
steam boats—had a significant advantage over those only served by 
turnpikes.   
With the encouragement of a national transportation infrastructure, 
lobbied both by national politicians and merchants, came an increase in the 
flow of information both in the form of formal newspapers and literature as 
well as more obviously the ability of individuals to communicate with traders 
                                                 
6 Channing, William Ellery “Remarks on Associations” The Works of William Ellery Channing. (1898) 
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from foreign locales.  The mere ability for citizens of a rural town to form 
social and business relations with those outside of their immediate 
geographic area placed businessmen on par with ministers, whose social 
network formed during their theological training heretofore provided a 
significant informational advantage that could be leveraged into an elite 
social and political position.  Politicians and residents of rural areas viewed 
political support for internal improvements a necessity, in contrast to the 
British model which relied upon private corporations to finance 
transportation development, because of the dispersed nature of the United 
States’ population, rapid westward expansion, and the need for fast and 
reliable transportation between urban city centers in New England and 
outlying agricultural and rural villages.   
Unlike in Britain, where trade routes were long established and both 
canals and railways would see an immediate return on investment as tolls 
could be collected by creating a route through existing settlements, 
government funding and assurances by the government of the profitability of 
private investment--as well as encouragement of citizens purchasing stock in 
private corporations as a patriotic act akin to purchasing war bonds—was 
necessary. (Goodrich 1960) 
The shift from a ‘communal spirit’ to a focus upon individual interest 
was brought about by the possibility of individual development beyond the 
local township—no longer did citizens have to abandon ties to family, friends, 
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and occupation to live in urban areas, but could instead travel and 
communicate with respectable speed to their original communities. “As Bruce 
Daniels argues, economic growth and increasing diversity served as 
important factors in ‘replacing a spirit of community with one of individual 
aspirations.’” (Cooper 281)7 
 
Chapter 4.2: Employment specialization 
 Professionalization and specialization also eroded the power of all 
religious denominations—both previous established churches and new fire 
and brimstone evangelical revivalists.  “Lawyers, physicians, professors, and 
merchants were all classes, and acted not as individuals but as though they 
were clergymen and each profession was a church.” (italics added) (Henretta, 
193)  Professional associations duplicated the social networking functions of a 
local church, and these associations were aided by being able to tap into a 
network of professionals across large geographic areas.  Infrastructure 
advances that allowed for conferences and gatherings of professionals created 
new forums for the distribution of information—entirely new ‘echo chambers’ 
in which citizens could discuss topics gleaned from national publications.  
Traditional institutions simply could not compete with voluntary associations 
that allowed individuals to pursue professional interests.  “Attempts to 
overcome the effects of economic development and of unconscious social drift 
                                                 
7 “Enthusiasts or Democrats? Separatism, Church Government and the Great Awakening in 
Massachusetts.” New England Quarterly (1992) 65(2). 
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through the creation of new ‘horizontal associations’ reflected the fact that 
the traditional ‘vertical institutions’ of the family, the church, and the 
community were unable to comprehend the new complexity of social life and 
individual experience…” (Cooper 220) 
 
Chapter 4.3: Religious revivals and secular competition 
Religious revivals—made possible by disestablishment, 
communications advances, and a transportation infrastructure that 
facilitated circuit riders to efficiently move between locales--only increased 
the speed and efficiency of the transfer of information in New England.  
Revivals brought strangers together for a common purpose, diminishing the 
wariness of outsiders previously sprouted to benefit insular communities.  
“This loss of a corporate impulse was reflected in a number of novel practices 
and attitudes shared by Separates and other New Lights.  For example, 
many churchgoers were now willing to cross-town lines and identify with 
speakers from outside the local community.  Translocal revivals inevitably 
brought strangers together, and the basis for religious experience was 
necessarily more subjective and individualistic than it had been in the 
seventeenth century, when members of the same community shared carefully 
structured forms of worship and church discipline.  As a consequence of the 
Great Awakening, churchgoers were also less inclined to regard theology as 
the exclusive province of the ministry.  (Cooper 281)   
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Traditional denominational authorities—who previously dominated all 
aspects of New England life—initially worked to replace the European 
sociopolitical tradition and establish a political and civic culture that checked 
federal power. (French 1968)  In response to the growing power of 
government in the United States, churches and clergymen acted to protect 
their own social role and promoted democratic and civil participation as a 
check against unbridled governmental power. “In the American context, the 
alliance of civic humanism and evangelicalism articulated a political theology 
based upon the language of citizenship, participation in the political 
community and, perhaps most important, justified a tradition of public 
opposition based upon the ideal values of the community.” (Gauvreau 1994, 
222)8  The dismantling of this infrastructure originally caused distress even 
amongst ministers of denominations other than the Congregationalists.  The 
prevailing notion—that mandatory church attendance or participation served 
as a moralizing influence, even participation in competing denominational 
services—soon gave way to a realization by evangelical clergymen that 
competition could spur not only innovation but increased consumption of 
religious services by laymen.  Concerning disestablishment, Lyman Beecher 
stated, “It was as dark a day as ever I saw.  The injury done to the cause of 
Christ, as we then supposed, was irreparable. For several days I suffered 
what no tongue can tell for the best thing that ever happened to the State of 
                                                 
8 Gauvreau, M. “The Empire of Evangelicalism: Varieties of Common Sense in 
Scotland, Canada, and the United States.” Evangelicalism. Ed: Noll, Mark. 
Oxford: Oxford UP.  (1994) 
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Connecticut.  It cut the churches loose from dependence on state support.  It 
threw them wholly on their own resources and on God”9 (Beecher 252, in 
Howe p. 164.)10 
Church leaders were only able to achieve political success when they 
abandoned efforts to control the distribution of information in their 
communities—standing in the way of the progress of technology and the flow 
of communication—and both adopt the techniques of 19th century mass 
political parties who distributed moral capital and responded strategically to 
the policy concerns, rather than attempting to hold onto their function as 
autonomous agencies which ran every aspect of life in 18th century New 
England communities.  Unlike Beecher, who attempted to organize 
evangelicals under a central organization, Charles Granderson Finney’s 
contribution to the evangelical cause centered upon innovative marketing 
methods still used by independent preachers and which posed a direct threat 
to established, local congregations.   
“Upon arriving in town, [Finney] would hold prolonged revival 
meetings and continue them for several days.  Sometimes he singled 
out individuals, praying for them by name to encourage their 
conversion.  Persons who seemed promising candidates might be 
seated in front of the church on what was called, “the anxious bench,”11 
especially if they were prominent citizens whose conversion would 
encourage others…He always preached extemporaneously, never from 
                                                 
9 The Autobiography of Lyman Beecher, ed. Barbara Cross. Cambridge, Mass. (1961) 
 
10 Howe, David Walker.  The Transformation of America, 1815-1848.  Oxford, England. Oxford UP.  
(2007).   
 
11 In my own travels to particularly successful contemporary, “mega-churches” during the July of 2006 the 
‘anxious bench’ was customary, with ushers charged with identifying new congregants and seating them in 
a ‘reserved’ section directly behind the organization’s minister and prominent congregational attendees.   
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a prepared script…America enjoyed a free marketplace in religion, and 
through is Lectures on Revivals of Religion (published in 1835) Finney 
instructed preachers on how to market their message.  In years to 
come, both political and commercial applications would be found for his 
principles.”  (Howe 2007, p.172) 
 
Disestablishment forced all denominations to be more responsive to 
parishioner preferences.  A market for religious services did not necessarily 
increase the flight of Congregational parishioners, as they would lose the 
social capital accumulated from their financial and resource investment in 
the denomination, but did force ministers to create new avenues for acquiring 
funds and relying solely upon parishioner donations.  “The nature of religious 
services was changed by making preachers dependent financially on church 
participation. This motivated the preacher to target his services to those 
active or potentially active in the church.” (Olds 281)   
Congregational clergymen did not expand membership as such a move 
would ‘water down’ the goods offered by membership—including a tight-knit 
community of influential parishioners, a lowering of theological knowledge to 
increase membership, and a less personal relationship with the minister for 
individual members.  Yet amongst those who merely attended services 
through community pressure due to the church’s moralizing mission, 
participation in alternative evangelical faiths was in fact aided by previous 
efforts of the Congregational church.  By successfully instilling the notion 
that religious participation served as a moralizing influence, yet not 
expanding their recruitment efforts, traditional religious denominations 
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served to only fuel the growth of new congregations, both by independent, fire 
and brimstone preachers, and by evangelizing denominations—most 
specifically the Methodists and Baptists. 
 The secular institutions posing the greatest threat to the established 
Congregational Church were political parties, in the particular form of the 
permanent institution able of leveraging its resources to distribute partisan 
information and efficiently organize citizens through association with secular 
narratives and partisan issues rather than under a theological framework. 
The constitutional structure of the American political system proved 
conducive to permanent political parties, and these institutions needed to 
undermine the existing sociopolitical infrastructure, dominated by 
established churches.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5:  The development of political parties as alternative 
organizers of social action 
 
The concurrence of the so-called ‘second great awakening’ and ‘second 
party system’ is not coincidental.  Combined with the power vacuum left by 
the disestablishment of state-sponsored religion in many states, the rise of 
political parties--and marginalization of religious denominations concerning 
matters of state--can be attributed to the specific democratic institutions 
inherent to the American electoral system.  The American political structure 
encouraged the development of a two-party system once a national dialogue 
could be established, and therefore undermine mere regional alliances, 
despite the founder’s disdain for such institutions. 
“Parties had appeared not because men wanted them—indeed, the 
Founding Fathers were almost unanimous in condemning their 
presence—but because there was no other way in which the people at 
large could be mobilized for effective political action…The traditional 
cultural brokers—ministers, lawyers, merchants, planters, farmers of 
wealth and education—who had served as connecting links between 
the separate communities had now been joined by politicians, men 
whose specific function it was to mediate disputes through the 
mechanism of the political process. (Henretta 221) 
 
Aldrich’s contention that unstable majorities gave rise to political parties fits 
with the fact that institutions that previously dominated social and political 
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life in New England—established churches—gave way to a plethora of 
religious organizations that competed to attract members and meet the needs 
of those members, creating a vacuum for social and political stability that 
was filled by political parties.  The creation a national party decreased the 
costs of each community relying upon competition amongst religious sects to 
control the social and political functions of the region’s citizens.  A 
liberalization of suffrage increased the percentage of Americans who voted in 
elections by 1828, but this increase was also due to a greater delineation of 
the differences between candidates through the creation of parties and 
brands by which the candidates could be identified.1    “Turnout among adult 
white males jumped from 26.5 percent in the presidential elections of 1825 to 
56.3 percent in those of 1828.”2  Schlesinger  continues his logic that a 
‘democratic spirit’, described as a, “mighty democratic uprising”3 (Schlesinger 
1947, p.36)  More rigorous traditional explanations for an increase in voter 
turnout argue such was due to, “heightened interest in presidential politics, 
greater competitiveness of the two parties in many states, and increased 
structuring of the parties in this period.” (Aldrich 1995)  The cause, however, 
of each of these explanations is due to the ability to transfer information 
                                                 
1 Probability of Voting ® is due to the probability the vote is effective times the differentiation between the 
candidates, plus the difference between the candidates plus the intensity of the voter’s preference for a 
given candidate minus the cost of voting (R= PB+B+D-C)  Thus, a greater perceived differentiation 
between candidates—rather than the expansion of the opportunity to vote is a logical justification for 
increased percentage of voters. (Aldrich 1995, p.102)  McCormick and Aldrich argue an increase in 
presidential suffrage—rather than general suffrage—increased from 1824 to 1828, as individuals voted to 
select electors in all but two states in 1828 as compared to 25% of states (6 of 24) in 1824.  
 
2 Aldrich, John.  Why Parties?.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  (1995) 
 
3 Schlessinger, Arthur.  The Age of Jackson.  New York: Brown Little.  (1947).  From Aldrich 1995.   
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efficiently through technological advances and the usurping of the previous 
monopoly held over communication and the dispersal of media by the 
established, state sponsored denominations.  Further, greater political action 
by religious groups—an outgrowth of their need to serve as political action 
committees to contend with secular political institutions—increased political 
action and expanded the echo chamber of secular issues even into religious 
communities.   
 
Chapter 5.1: Political parties leverage culture 
Other interpretations of culture—most notably the ‘tool kit’ model—
would intimate that cultural symbols and institutions would allow 
individuals to align themselves with symbols that are rich in meaning--or 
brands--and that align with pre-existing beliefs.  In the case of political 
parties, both of these views are possible.  Van Buren, Tammany, and early 
political parties pitted the evangelical, second great awakening churches 
against older religious institutions that controlled social, political, and 
economic functions, echoing and reinforcing the latent criticism of the 
emerging lower and middle class that such ancient institutions were elitist.  
Martin Van Buren, the founder of the Democratic Party and the organizer of 
the New York-Virginia alliance4 that particularly benefitted Andrew Jackson-
-and subsequently his own Presidential aspirations--linked the elitism of 
                                                 
4 “In short, Van Buren combined an appeal to win the 1828 election with a commitment to forging a truly 
national political party, reviving Jeffersonian Republicanism by linking, ;planters in the South with plan 
Republicans in the North’ (Remini 1963, p.6)” (Aldrich 1995 p. 108) 
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traditional religious institutions to his critique of the European monarchs 
against which Americans revolted.  “That Revolution, which shattered, “past 
all surgery,” the blasphemous and absurd dogma of the divine right of kings; 
which replaced the slavish doctrine of passive obedience and non-
resistance…The great principle first formally avowed by Rousseau, ‘that the 
right to exercise sovereignty belongs inalienably to the people.” 5(Van Buren 
13)  Political parties, Van Buren argues, are a check upon monarchical 
institutions in the United States—a response to a single national ‘unity’ that 
results in centralized, federal power superseding the power of each individual 
state.” 
Parties—and Van Buren and his Tammany gang6--worked to 
dismantle the control of older denominations by leveraging the rhetoric of 
new churches, as well as mirroring the recruitment tactics of the fire-and-
                                                 
5 In one example, Martin Van Buren reads the history of caucus nominations—private matters reserved for 
elites rather than by popular support of the party’s members--as the reason for the downfall of William 
Crawford, the predicted victor in the election of 1824--not Van Buren’s own collusion with Jackson or 
Adams’ bargain with Calhoun.   
 
“Mr. Crawford was the only candidate who, it was believed, could be benefited by adhering to [the caucus 
system] and the friends of all the others sustained the policy of the administration.  Those of Jackson, 
Adams, Clay, and Calhoun, united in an address to the people condemning the practice of caucus 
nominations, and announcing their determination to disregard them.  Already weakened through the 
adverse influence of the administration, the agency which had so long preserved the unity of the 
Republican party did not retain sufficient strength to resist the combined assault that was made upon it, and 
was overthrown.  Mr. Crawford and his friends adhered to it to the last, and fell with it.” (Van Buren 5) 
 
6 In his autobiography, Van Buren discusses his honorable friends at Tammany and their alliance with 
Chief Justice Taney, demonstrating the extent of the political influence of the New York political gang.  
“Having been a second time invited by my old political friends of Tammany Hall, before the Presidential 
election of 1856, to submit my views upon the then state of the question, I gave them in a letter which 
presented the whole subject in a form and was written in a spirit which many thought well calculated to 
make favorable impressions on well-intentioned and sober-minded men.The able, judgelike, and I may add, 
statesmanlike, views taken by Chief Justice Taney and by Justice Daniel, of that branch of the subject, have 
satisfied me that the [Dred Scott] judgment of the court upon it was right.” (Van Buren 356) 
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brimstone preachers of the second great awakening.  Van Buren recognized 
the organizational and social control mechanisms inherent to religious 
groups, and couched numerous arguments in theological terms--most notably 
for the purposes of this paper, anti-Sabbatarianism.  Indeed, religious elites 
demonstrated little ability to counter the effectiveness of political parties, and 
instead focused their efforts on influencing issues on the public agenda rather 
than either forming their own political parties--as the Christian Democrats of 
Europe would soon do7--or effectively supporting a particular candidate over 
another.  Even in Connecticut, a state commonly thought to be sympathetic 
to John Adams and later the Whig Party, supported effective political parties 
and whose election results quickly mirrored the national returns after 
Jackson failed to even register in the state in the election of 1824. 
 
                                                 
7 The rise of the Christian Democrats in Europe resulted from conflict between Catholic elites and liberal 
elites. (Trejo; Kalyvas 1996)  Christian Democrat parties were successful in Europe because the electoral 
system rewarded minority parties, with parliamentary systems allowing minority parties to protect their 
interests and effectively function as political interest committees through bargaining their seats away for 
political prizes.  After the firm entrenchment of two dominant political parties in the United States, a 
political party based solely upon religious identity would have failed unless it could properly threaten an 
existing party by drawing enough votes to swing an election.  Moreover, any religious group would have to 
deliver over fifty percent of any individual state in which it was dominant to a particular federal candidate 
to entice that candidate to change their platform in exchange for the electoral votes of the state the religious 
party dominates.  
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---   Jackson/Van Buren Connecticut 
___  Jackson/Van Buren National8 
 
While politicians could attempt to use religious denominations to their 
advantage, the threat posed by any alternative, large-scale institution was 
still too significant to support the Marxist notion of true social control by 
political parties and a socioeconomic elite over the masses through religious 
organization.  Indeed, Van Buren’s New York-Virginia alliance which formed 
the backbone of the original Democratic Party would fall susceptible to the 
abolitionists forty years after the election of Jackson.   
The First Amendment ensured a rise of local competition for religious 
groups, each of which took a different approach in their attempts to remain in 
                                                 
8 Presidential Elections, 1789-1996 Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. (1997) 
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existence in the face of a rapidly expanding and changing theological and 
political landscape. 
“Primarily, institutional not personal rivalry was the cause of clerical 
resentment of politics.  Political organizations were competing with the 
churches for a national constituency.  To the distress of the clergy, the 
politicians were winning.  William Cooper Howells recalled that before 
Jackson poisoned ‘the practical politics of the country,” people talked 
much more about ‘freedom of the will’ and ‘predestination’ than the 
latest news from Washington.  The encroachment of political 
excitement was felt even within the affairs of religion itself.  Elias 
Cornelius, a benevolent society functionary, complained, ‘Political 
jealousy kindles up a thousand bad passions in different parts of the 
United States, and these transfer themselves to the religious 
movements of the church,” leading to heresies and schisms.’ (Wyatt-
Brown 322) 
 
Chapter 5.2: Technology as centralizing force 
Rather than decentralizing information, that is, allowing a greater 
amount of input from a larger range of sources and therefore opening debate 
and discourse to a wider variety of sources, technological innovations 
centralize debate by increasing the ability of a national narrative. 
Individuals, rather than liberalizing discourse through an increased ability to 
comment upon and proliferate their own opinions, cluster around topics they 
know others are informed about and which others may comment upon.  
Whereas future technological advances lowered the cost of entry for 
publishers, the railroad allowed a limited number of powerful individuals and 
entities create a unified national dialogue around a select number of topics.  
While these publications were primarily extensions of partisan entities--
political parties, corporations, and religious denominations--their result was 
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twofold.  First, because of their partisan nature, party papers largely 
attacked competing publications and factions.  In order to have a debate, 
certain standards must be implicitly or explicitly agreed upon; while the 
engaging parties certainly did not abide by conventions of civility, they at 
least clustered around specific topics.  By creating ‘talking points’, individuals 
of diverse backgrounds could engage in debates and discussions without 
extensive study of the issues.  Second, partisan publications clustered issues, 
effectively forming parties through juxtaposing positions on a plethora of 
issues around a single ideological focus--liberal, conservative, 
denominational, etc.  
Future communications innovations were developments of degree, but 
the transportation revolution and creation of national transportation 
infrastructure was the fundamental shift, the creation of a national narrative 
and the breakdown of all ties being primarily geographic.  ‘Jacksonian 
Democracy’ was the result of Martin Van Buren’s alliance and development of 
the Democratic Party, creating the first truly national political machine.  
Such a national alliance would not have been possible without an efficient 
national transportation infrastructure, allowing not only for a national 
dialogue but also coordination of a national political party—centralization 
through not only disseminating information and instructions from the 
centralized agent to franchisees and local leaders, but the reporting of 
information back to the centralized agent.  The ability to set up mechanisms 
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for local party leaders and members to report back to the central 
headquarters—thereby stemming off potential problems and reinforcing 
successful methods--as well as allowing for local angles on national issues--
dramatically increased the efficiency of institutions and gave political parties 
an important advantage over otherwise decentralized sociopolitical 
institutions that dominated local life—churches.9 
For political parties and consumers of news, the first amendment’s 
most important innovation, and its largest threat to traditional clergy, was 
the freedom of association.  The geographic scope of the United States 
instilled an incentive for politicians to subsidize the flow of communications 
both to undermine traditional forms of power, through the development of a 
national dialogue, and maintain their own institutions--both political parties 
and alliances that traversed geographic boundaries--through reliable and 
timely communication.  The Constitution undermined state-sponsored 
religious institutions not simply by separating church from state, as the 
state-sponsorship of a particular denomination was neither explicit nor 
notably clear to federal and state authorities during the first few decades of 
the nation, but by enshrining the freedom of association.  Freedom of 
association allowed alternative denominations to flourish--alongside civic 
groups and political parties that competed with the clergy for the time, 
money, and energy of citizens--and creating electoral incentives for national-
                                                 
9 McCubbins, Mat and Arthur Lupia.  “Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols 
Reconstructed.”  Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.  (10)1. (1994).  
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level politicians to first forge alliances based on ideological, rather than 
geographic ties.  Elected officials had an incentive to subsidize 
communications technology to create a national dialogue that was based on 
news--and particularly political news--rather than allowing each township’s 
social leader--the clergyman with the broadest and deepest social network--to 
control the flow and dissemination of information within a geographic area.  
Thus, while common explanations for the US having more post office and 
newspapers per capita than any other nation in the world by 1820 (Brown, 
117) evolve around the early Americans having the right to freedom of 
speech, state support of commercial enterprises that were often hostile to 
individual causes--due to the partisan nature of every early American 
publication--by no means logically followed from such an enshrined right. 
“Intimately tied with the fear of partisanship was clerical jealousy of the 
politician.  Helplessly observing that churchgoers no longer heeded their 
secular opinions, recognizing that ministerial salaries were not keeping pace 
with other professional occupations, and noting those ever-so-slight signs of a 
slipping social status, clergymen might well have resented the prestige of 
lawyer-politicians whom the people elected without clerical advice.” (Wyatt-
Brown 321)10 
 
 
                                                 
10 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, “Abolitionism: Its meaning for Contemporary American Reform” Midwest 
Quarterly Autumn 166 45-48 
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Chapter 5.3: Political party organization 
Political parties fashioned themselves after religious organizations, 
and their recruitment techniques mirrored evangelical revivals common in 
the United States during the early 19th century that became known as the 
Great Awakening.  Electioneers copied techniques of religious revivalists, 
including, “torchlight parades, the pitching of a tent on the edge of town, and 
emotional calls to ‘step right up’ and make a commitment. (The techniques 
were later adapted by Phineas T. Barnum to the circus, with the ‘barker’ 
playing the role of the evangelist.)”  (Howe 1985 372)  Such techniques 
became commonplace with the Whig Party and the common-man campaigns 
of Andrew Jackson, yet efforts to foster a communal atmosphere certainly 
began with the earliest party-bosses in their attempts to build their parties 
and recruit members. (Heale 1982)  During the 1820s and 1830s, a “mass 
electorate had internalized party loyalty on so vast and intense a scale that a 
new context for political activity was constituted.”  (Formisano 1971 3)  
Political activity during and after Jackson’s election in 1828 were dominated 
by parties and their ability to recruit and maintain nonpolitical groups, 
particularly the recruitment of religious organizations that dominated early 
19th century life.  The method by which the Jacksonians—and later all 
political actors—attempted to maximize their political influence was through 
leveraging mass communication. “Newspapers played an essential role in 
making representative government meaningful and in fostering among the 
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citizens a sense of American nationality beyond the face-to-face politics of 
neighborhoods.” (emphasis added) (Howe 2009, p. 228)  Party organs, which 
regularly ran a deficit, received funding from wealthy patrons--including 
political cabals such as the Tammany Gang--and lucrative government 
printing contracts if the party they served was in power. (Weisberger 1961)   
Indeed, political parties became national entities by formulating a 
broad mission statement and localizing the actual political experience, 
particularly with the help of church endorsement that allowed parties to 
monopolize voters in a given geographic area.  This strategy was copied 
directly from the Methodist recruitment and nationalization efforts of the late 
18th century, creating a broad national message and allowing local 
congregations to recruit and maintain parishioner support.  The 
decentralized nature of Methodist congregations necessitated an extensive 
communication system to ensure each congregation maintained a connection 
with one another, and no one congregation would break off and form its own 
religion.  The informal yet entrenched communication structure established 
to facilitate a unified Methodist faith also bound political parties and was the 
model—intentionally or not—upon which parties developed throughout the 
19th century.  (Mathews 1968)  Despite a preference for nonparty and 
antiparty candidates, political parties were able to flourish—particularly in 
national elections—and advances in communications would strengthen the 
abilities of both churches and parties to communicate thus threatening the 
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autonomy and power of local church and political official.  (Voss-Hubbard 
1999) 
 Perhaps counter to popular conceptions of the likely side of the 
Jacksonian on issues related to postage and national news, their allegiance 
with small town and rural communities actually created an incentive for the 
Democrats to champion low postal rates and increased networks of 
communication.  They were forced to balance the needs of their constituents--
that is, the desire of small town publishers to limit the influence and entry of 
large urban papers--and the desire to create a national dialogue (and the 
ability to communicate with local, rural leaders) through efficient, timely, 
and inexpensive means.  While the Jacksonians hesitated to eliminate 
newspaper postage because, “they feared [doing so] would extend the reach of 
city papers with alien values,” (Kielbowicz 58) they also needed to 
disseminate their own message (and, as discussed later, receive news and 
confirmation of compliance to central strategies, messages, and values back 
from rural politicians).  The balance for Democrats, therefore, was to ensure 
citizens in rural villages and remote townships engaged in a dialogue on a 
select number of national issues, but were also biased in the direction of 
Democratic and Jacksonian policies through the maintenance of dominant 
local publications.  Without dismantling traditional structures of power in 
rural communities, Jacksonians would not have been able to maximize their 
power, influence, and control over these areas and their electors. 
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 Rather than ‘democratize’ power in the United States--that is, attempt 
empower individual citizens to affect government policies and limit the 
‘vertical’ power structure that had taken root, the creation of a national 
dialogue did not expand the number of citizens able to provide input upon 
issues, but rather limited debate in the country through limiting the number 
of nodes of sociopolitical power.  Whereas previously each township--largely 
isolated from urban areas and with a limited number of individuals (often 
one) with access to news and information outside Of course, the power 
structures the Jacksonians and the Whigs were forced to undermine were 
different.  In the south and west--traditional strongholds of Democratic 
power—Jackson could gain support through personal recognition, and, later, 
establish a strong and lasting political party through identification both with 
Jackson and a particular ideology, free from competition with existing 
entities that claimed similar ideological stances. 
 Thus Jackson’s competition with existing power structures was limited.  
Van Buren derived his power from traditional supporters of Jackson as well 
as the Tammany Hall ring--a group whose association with the press was 
primarily hostile.  Both the Democrat’s southern and western supporters 
produced partisan publications--as well as the newspapers and broadsheets 
funded by the Tammany gang--rather than their aim being to undermine 
traditional power structures through the conveyance of timely information, it 
was as propaganda, the timeliness and reliability of which was less than that 
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of newspapers aimed a drawing attention away from the pastor’s Sunday 
sermon. 
In New York City, an odd array of Tammany men, newspapermen, 
tavern-owners, ward-heelers, labor leaders, middle-class proprietors, 
and some wealthy figures…allied themselves against the Sabbath 
Union.  These same figures were to be responsible for several anti-
abolitionist riots of a later date…The anticlerical masses were highly 
suspicious of any signs of elitism…Among the very poor and depressed, 
suspicion of evangelical elitism had a basis of fact.  Thousands of less 
privileged citizens were made desperate enough by the vast economic 
dislocations of the era to believe the Jacksonian attacks upon the ‘wise 
and good.’  They blamed all sorts of corporations, especially banks, but 
also other institutions for their plight.  According to some radical labor 
leaders, churchmen were seeking to buttress the defenses of property. 
(Wyatt-Brown p.333)  
 
Party bosses and the political elites attacked any institution threatening 
political hegemony, and for the Democrats alternative social, economic, and 
political institutions were just as threatening as alternative political parties.  
Indeed, the Whigs controlled few aspects of the United States political 
infrastructure during the Jacksonian era and in fact can largely be described 
as a collection of political interest groups rather than a centralized party that 
the interest groups attempted to influence.  “In political terms, though, the 
religious community was clearly as vulnerable as Nicholas Biddle’s bank.  
The outcry of Jackson’s supporters, which included men from all classes of 
society, was too great for the politicians to ignore.  They quickly sensed that 
the evangelicals had not yet come to dominate any class of society, any major 
areas of the country, or any single denomination in such a way that they 
posed an electoral threat.”  (Wyatt-Brown 333) 
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Chapter 5.4: Clergy responses to political parties 
The initial reaction of churchmen to democratic institutions was one of 
caution--“If, as church leaders expected, most Americans became practicing 
Christians, democracy, as an abstract theory at least, offered no serious 
problems…By selective voting, irrespective of party labels, Christians could 
compel civil officials to enforce the laws against Sabbath violation, duels, 
swearing, drunkenness, and vagrancy.” (Wyatt-Brown 321)11  The lack of 
foresight—or the inability to control the unyielding progress of technological 
innovation—left traditional Christian institutions unable to tempter or 
oppose the use of the first amendment by political parties, assisting in the 
party’s capture of democratic political institutions.  The attack by the 
Jacksonians upon religious institutions that they needed to overthrow in 
order to gain control of the functions of the state was by charging elitism—
religious institutions, by their nature, were anti-democratic.  “The Anti-
Federal party by their pertinacious, nay morbid perseverance in a wrong 
course, exposed themselves to the same penalty which was at a later period 
inflicted upon their old opponents—as a party they were overthrown and 
ruined.” (Van Buren 380)  Moreover, successful and lasting churches were 
conservative in their orthodoxy and required a great deal from members, 
thereby threatening the attention men would pay to political issues and 
would threaten the authority of political parties over their social lives.   
                                                 
11 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, “Abolitionism: Its meaning for Contemporary American Reform” Midwest 
Quarterly Autumn 166 45-48 
 
 90 
Chapter 5.5: Van Buren’s historical narrative 
Moreover, these churches appealed to their own historical roots and 
traditions to justify participation by members.  Just as political elites copied 
the methods of evangelical revivalists, so to did the early party leaders 
attempt to appeal to the nation’s historical leaders as the ideological founders 
of their parties.  Van Buren links the history of the Democratic party to the 
federalist/anti-Federalist debate, arguing political factions have always 
existed in American political life and the ‘era of good feelings’ was a 
monarchical period that undermined the democratic institutions of the 
United States.  He presents the rise of the Democratic party as an outgrowth 
of previous political factions, rather than a new entity in American political 
life.  By presenting this state as natural, Van Buren ignores the reason for 
the rise of parties at all in the United States, and particularly the rise of his 
political party.   
The two great parties of this country, with occasional changes in their 
names only, have, for the principal part of a century, occupied 
antagonistic positions upon all important political questions.  They 
have maintained an unbroken succession, and have, throughout, been 
composed respectively of men agreeing in their party passions and 
preferences, and entertaining, with rare exceptions, similar general 
views on the subjects of government and its administration…Neither 
the influences of marriage connections, nor of sectarian prejudices, nor 
any of the strong motives which often determine the ordinary actions 
of men, have, with limited exceptions, been sufficient to override the 
bias of party organization and sympathy, devotion to which has, on 
both sides, as a rule, been a master passion of their members.12 (Van 
Buren 7)  
                                                 
12 The Origin and Course of Political Parties in the United States. Martin Van Buren.  Hurd and Houghton, 
New York. (1867) 
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At every point in American history, Van Buren inserts the Democratic party--
or links the successful and popular initiatives of Washington and Jefferson to 
a primitive iteration of the Democratic party.  Attempting to lay claim to the 
‘national creed’ and root the Democratic Party in American history mirrors 
Huntington’s theory of the evolution of political institutions, and the success 
of Van Buren helped entrench an anti-elitist narrative in the American 
political establishment. Van Buren attributed the stunting of Federalist 
expansion to deny states rights and increase the power of the executive to the 
rise of the Democratic Party in the election of 1800, and lauds the Democrats 
for quashing the attempt of the judiciary to fill the power vacuum that was 
left by the fall of the Federalists.  He links Jefferson and the ‘old Republicans’ 
as defending the nation against Hamilton’s expansion of the Treasury and 
the issuance of public debt, and intimates the roots of the Democratic party 
can be discerned as early as this dispute in 1792.  Immediately after 
discussing the opposition of ‘old Republicans’—to whom Van Buren links his 
contemporary Democratic party—to the issuance of public debt, he links the 
current opposition of the Democrats to the expansion of federal power 
through increased internal improvements.  “The promotion of internal 
improvements by the General Government was an assumption of power by 
Congress against which, from its first inception till its substantial overthrow, 
the Democratic party interposed a steady, persevering, and inflexible 
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resistance…For preservation from such prodigality and debt, and from the 
corruptions that would have followed in their train, we are plainly and 
undeniably indebted to the successful enforcement of the principles of the 
Democratic Party.” (421)  Indeed, Van Buren refers to a, “Democratic spirit” 
that was present and, “overshadow[ed] the money power in the country,” on 
which can be traced to the initial settlers of the Union. “For the signal 
success of its beneficent and glorious mission the country is indebted to the 
virtue and intelligence of the men of whom this great party has from time to 
time been composed…and its founder, Thomas Jefferson, who stands, in my 
estimation, as a faithful republican, pure patriot, and wise and accomplished 
statesman.” (Van Buren 424) 
In explaining the fall of alternative political factions, Van Buren 
focuses upon their inability--or refusal--to adapt to changing electoral 
conditions and the Anti-Federalists’, who Van Buren associates with the 
Whigs and therefore the established religious leaders who previously 
controlled the sociopolitical infrastructure of New England life. 
Fault was the exclusiveness of their preference. They could not and did 
not deny that a general government of some sort was indispensible, 
and they should therefore have stood ready to confer upon it such 
powers as were necessary to enable it to sustain itself and to qualify it 
for the successful performance of the duties to be assigned to it. This 
they would not do.  They, on the contrary, allowed their local 
prejudices and their suspicious, in some instances well founded but 
unwisely indulged, to lead them to persistent refusals to concede to the 
Federal head means which a sufficient experience had show to be 
absolutely necessary to good government. (Van Buren 379) 
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The Congregationalists not only identified secular political institutions as the 
primary threat to their continued social and political preeminence, but also 
recognized their leveraging of new communication infrastructure as the 
method by which the power of the Congregational Church would be 
undermined.  As such, the primary political movement prior to abolitionism 
in America was Sabbatarianism, organized by established churches to combat 
the encroachment of secular interests upon the last area of American life 
monopolized by the church, the Sunday sermon.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 6: Sabbatarianism as Congregational response to 
institutional threats 
 
As early as the first great awakening, successful religious figures 
recognized the advantage of coverage in secular publications and leveraged 
stances on secular issues to gain media coverage.  “There was a reason why 
religion was not primary in the news, and that was because it was not 
popular or useful in the marketplace.  In utilizing secular news, [prominent 
first great awakening minister George] Whitefield1 was at once presenting 
religion as a popular commodity that could compete not so much against 
other churches as against the goods and services of this world…” (Stout 1993)  
Denominations and sects took stances on political issues to offer their 
congregants a brand with which to identify themselves—by referring to 
oneself as a Methodist, individuals could self identify not only with a set of 
theological beliefs but also political and social stances.  Moreover, by 
providing congregants with a vehicle for social action and a forum to easily 
mobilize for a social or political cause, churches increased the amount of time 
and resources congregants spent involved in contributing to the church—even 
                                                 
1 George Whitefield, perhaps the most successful evangelist of the first great awakening and active during 
the 1730s and 1740s. 
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if efforts were directed at secular causes.  Social capital was created and 
networks strengthened through participation in the social network of the 
church, as well as the ability to market the religious community as a vehicle 
for social participation, thereby competing with parties as an alternative 
forum for sociopolitical action.  
The paramount issue in which secular forces and the 
Congregationalists clashed was the sanctity of the Sabbath.  Whereas other 
denominations attempted to increase influence through democratic means—
that is, expanding their flock and controlling a majority of Americans on a 
national scale—Congregationalists increased their missionary activities and 
formed voluntary societies to influence national policy, but most significantly-
-and fervently--engaged in the Sabbatarian movement.  By 1850 the 
telegraph undermined any efforts by the Sabbatarians to limit the flow of 
information and monopolize social life on Sundays, as the near-immediate 
dissemination of information completed the construction of a constant, real-
time, national discourse, yet during the first few decades of the nineteenth 
century the clergy’s attempt to limit the flow of information at least on 
Sunday was a serious effort that, if successful, would have preserved the 
social importance of the church, at least for the single day of rest for the 
community’s members, a time when discussion with neighbors was most 
probable.  The Sabbatarians developed two strategies to influence political 
actors.  The ‘mainstream’ evangelical revivalists, such as Lyman Beecher, 
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behaved similarly to the Congregationalists to develop petitions and 
influence existing political institutions, whereas ministers whose recruiting 
tactics were marked by fire-and-brimstone rhetoric, engaged in behavior that 
directly confronted the secular establishment. 
Sabbatarians were united in the petition enterprise, but from the start 
two divergent strategies emerged.  Although [Lyman[ Beecher 
sometimes spoke in extravagant terms of Christianizing every aspect 
of secular life, he favored the use of quiet persuasion, conversations 
with leading men, and firm tugs at the levers of power.  Lewis Tappan 
and Bissell, believing that Sabbatarians had to fight the agencies of 
darkness with every weapon available…Christians were urged to 
withhold their trade from offending firms; articles appeared in 
religious journals to question if New York churches should heat their 
buildings from utilities operation no Sunday and to propose the 
abolition of milk deliveries on Sunday mornings in Boston.  Like the 
teetotalers, the Sabbatarian zealots reasoned that little indulgences 
led to greater crimes; and therefore, they demanded the pledge of total 
abstinence. (Wyatt-Brown 330) 
 
Prior to the railroads and canals that created a national transportation 
infrastructure, communication primarily existed by interpersonal 
communication by travelers and, by the end of the 18th century, the most 
efficient and timely method was by boat--ships along the eastern seaboard 
and later via steamboat on the nation’s interior canals.  While on its face 
limiting the Sabbath mails would seem to be a threat to New England 
businessmen, the alliance between many New England merchants and the 
clergy to limit the Sabbath mails was not only founded in a theological basis 
but conveniently extended the advantage of those living on the Eastern 
Seaboard against their southern and western competitors.  In fact, not only 
did news have to travel 33 hours to reach Philadelphia from New York, 
 97 
transporting the news to Pittsburgh was both impossible until 1788 and 
subsequently took two weeks to make the trip.  Moreover, “Once news 
reached the Pittsburgh Gazette, there was no local post office to deliver the 
paper.  The Gazette’s editor prevailed on his friends to carry papers outside 
the city, and subscribers living along western Pennsylvania’s waterways 
looked to riverboats for their copies.” (Kielbowicz 25) 
 
Chapter 6.1: Petitioning efforts as religious response 
The shift by both new evangelical revivalists and traditional 
denominations, including the Congregationalists, from monopolizing the 
sociopolitical life in New England to working as political action committees 
began with petition efforts lobbying for the sanctity of the Sabbath. 
Sabbatarians—though unsuccessful prior to 1850—developed methods later 
utilized by the abolitionists and worked to influence political parties. 
The process of collecting funds, disseminating petitions and tracts, 
arranging rallies and concerts of prayer, training and supplying 
volunteers, and writing potential supporters engaged the evangelical 
leaders in work that hardly differed from that of the politicians whom 
they sought to impress…Nothing demonstrated this change in 
religious action more clearly than the petition effort, a method of 
agitation that later proved useful to the abolitionists.  The chief object 
was to overwhelm congressional delegates with the demonstrated 
outrage of thousands of voters. the Sabbatarians were the first to 
exploit it on a grand scale.  The effort was a total failure, but it gave 
experience in political lobbying. (Wyatt-Brown 329) 
 
The reaction by politicians and industrialists to the Sabbatarian movement 
demonstrates the threat it posed to both industry and the traditional clergy, 
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and serves as an excellent proxy for the struggle to control the issues and 
forums in which men debated (and therefore the issues upon which they 
focused).   
It is ironic that so restrictive a cause as Sabbatarianism should lead so 
many pious dissenters to a deepened sense of the meaning of 
democracy and equal rights, but it was so…the religious abolitionists 
were not seeking to destroy government, but to expand its functions in 
behalf of those outside existing legal arrangements.  In doing so, they 
fought a raucous, unformed, and novel institution, the American party 
system, which the Sabbatarian venture had already shown to be an 
obstacle to that much more venerable and stable institution, the 
church. (Wyatt-Brown, 340)   
 
Technological innovation—specifically, effective and timely distribution 
mechanisms for national publications—was the primary determinant of 
religious denominations transitioning into political action committees, and 
preceded the most significant church-state conflict prior to abolition.   
 
Chapter 6.2: Congressional support of information distribution 
The postal act of 1792 attempted to allay the concerns of small-town 
publishers while maximizing the flow of information in the United States.  
Specifically, small town publishers worried a single rate for printed material 
would leave them at a disadvantage as publication costs in small 
communities was higher than in major metropolitan areas.  Congress 
determined rates for material traveling up to 100 miles would be one cent, 
whereas mail traveling over 100 miles would be 1.5 cents. “Letter postage, in 
contrast, was divided into nine zones, ranging from a minimum of 6 cents per 
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sheet for delivery up to 30 miles to a maximum of 25 cents power sheet for 
any distance beyond 450 miles.” (Kielbowicz 34) 
Sectionalism, a component of the cultural differences, seeped into 
postal debates.  But even more pronounced was the tension between 
urban and rural interests.  Through adjustments in postal policy, rural 
legislators sought to protect small-circulation newspapers of country 
districts that increasingly faced competition from metropolitan dailies 
and weeklies.  This not only insulated the business of an important 
class of constituents—publishers—but also was seen as preserving the 
values of country life from an encroaching urban culture. (Kielbowicz 
3)2 
 
While claiming to protect rural culture, the fact publications tapped into a 
larger national narrative--and individuals had access to multiple publications 
that addressed multiple topics--caused secular interests to compete with 
religious services during the leisure time of citizens.  The blatant 
competition—especially on the Sabbath—enraged the clergy and served as a 
tangible manifestation of the secularization of society.  Their authority—
previously near absolute with regard to the communication of news from 
outside the town—was undermined by meeting locations alternative to the 
church and documents serving as competition to the Bible as required 
reading to engage in social, political, and economic discussions with 
neighbors.  At the extremes, citizens went so far as to simply stand up and 
leave religious services when a postal delivery arrived on Sundays.   
 
[On] ’post day’ half the village assembled to be present at the 
distribution of the mail, which in good and bad weather alike, took 
                                                 
2 Kielbowicz, Richard.  News in the Mail: The Press, Post Office and Public Information, 1700-1860s.  
Greenwood Press. (1989). 
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place at the inn.  The package for the whole village was generally made 
up of a roll of newspapers a week old and a few bundles of drugs for the 
doctor.  It was a great day whereon, in addition to the usual post, a 
half-dozen letters were given out.  Then, as the townsmen press 
around the inn door to make arrangement for borrowing the 
‘newsprint’ or to hear the contents of it read aloud by the minister or 
landlord, the postman was carried home.” (Smith 186, from Kielbowicz 
26)3 
 
The Sabbatarian movement posed a grave economic threat to both the west 
and to industrialists attempting to form a cohesive national economy.  
Newspapermen were threatened by limiting attention to political issues, and 
newspapers of the time were instruments of either corporations, political 
parties, or religious groups (the latter of which would benefit from 
monopolizing one day each week).  While the elites in each of these fields 
dominated the anti-Sabbatarian movement, they did so by criticizing the 
religious authorities pushing the movement as in fact elitism, pushing the 
line that the Sabbatarian movement was intended to moralize the poor, 
huddled masses.  Thus, while Tammany, corporations, and newspapermen 
profited immensely from the labor of the masses, they effectively limited 
competition from traditional religious groups competing for the time (and 
money) of the poor.  The anti-commercialism streak of the traditional 
religious elites only exacerbated the threat posed by those denominations, 
fueling the effort of the anti-Sabbatarians. 
 
                                                 
3 Smith, James Morton.  Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties 
Cornel UP: Ithaca, NY. 1956 
  
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions regarding the role of transportation and 
communication infrastructure in the development of early American 
social and political institutions 
 
This paper traced the formation of political parties and the 
transformation of American religious life to the revolutionary technological 
innovations in transportation and communication that occurred at the turn of 
the 19th century.  By identifying the source of power of the Congregational 
Church as its ability to leverage its monopoly over the distribution of 
information—and the primary disruption of this institution’s power as 
technological development that gave rise to competing secular institutions, I 
revise the goals of the Congregational Church as primarily placing it in 
competition with political and secular institutions rather than new 
evangelical sects.  My contributions are two fold.  First, I attempt to redefine 
the goals of the Congregational Church, as desiring to control not the largest 
possible share of religious congregants but instead leverage an existing base 
of support and a monopoly over the flow of information in New England to 
shape secular life in New England.  Second, I attempt to merge the second 
great awakening and second party system in order for future scholars to view 
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the events of the first half of the nineteenth century not through the lens of 
the development of multiple isolated and specialized markets, but as both 
secular and religious institutions competing for the same set of resources 
through a shock to the established social infrastructure via technology 
undermining a monopoly over information which the Congregational Church 
had, for over a century, leveraged to control discourse and social functioning 
in New England.  It was this shock—not the disestablishment of religion—
that truly threatened the church and caused an upheaval in the social and 
political power structure of New England. 
 
Chapter 7.1: Future research 
 Two elusive, and perhaps non-existent datasets serve as the launching 
point for this project’s future research.  First, as I hypothesize in this essay, 
Congregational clergy were able to create and support a social network 
through informal ties created through mandatory training that served also 
functioned as a networking tool.  This social network allowed for clergy 
coordination and stifled competition, as Congregational clergy claimed 
geographical territory and did not create competing congregations within a 
region.  Evidence supports this hypothesis in Connecticut, yet correlating the 
rise in the number of congregations founded in a given region with the rise in 
population and the creation of alternative evangelical sects in that region will 
demonstrate that Congregational clergy did not recruit and compete to the 
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same extent of other sects, and the goal of the Congregational elites was not 
in fact to maximize membership but instead to maintain existing members, 
effectively shift funding from a reliance upon state support to member 
donations, and maintain membership as a symbol of high status and a 
privilege for the social, political, and economic elite.   
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